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INTRODUCTION 
It is interesting to note that the property protected in the 
copyright system are works of authorship, defined within eight 
illustrative categories as: literary works; musical works; dramatic 
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic 
and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
sound recordings; and architectural works in § 102 of the 
Copyright Act,1 and yet, authorship as a creative human endeavor 
has received very little attention as a legal concept that may aid 
jurists and policy makers in setting an acceptable balance between 
private property rights and public interests in literary and artistic 
works as the protected subject matter of copyright law.  This 
Article argues that understanding the notion of creative authorship 
as a unique, yet fundamentally intrinsic, human expression will 
assist copyright policy makers and judges in reaching policy and 
legal decisions that reflect more accurately the realities of creating 
literary and artistic works.  Here, this Article makes a call for a 
clear demarcation between authorial rights in literary and artistic 
works, and the economic rights to print, publish and distribute 
these works. 
A good place to start thinking about authorial rights in literary 
and artistic works is to identify the role of the author within the 
copyright system.  This Article argues that contrary to scholarly 
literature that contends the role of the romantic author in the 
copyright system is antiquated and is an inaccurate depiction of the 
actual process of creativity, the notion of the romantic author is 
actually the most important concept in copyright to assist in fairly 
 
 1 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) [hereinafter The Copyright Act]; id. § 102 (providing 
eight illustrative categories of works of authorship). 
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allocating rights and entitlements in literary and artistic works.  
When we think of the reverence society gives William 
Shakespeare as an author and playwright, what we really see is the 
special connection that an author has with his audience, or readers, 
and in Shakespeare’s case, this author–reader connection is second 
to none.  Shakespeare has had, and continues to have, an immense 
influence on his audiences and readers.  Harold Bloom refers to 
him as “the most influential of all authors during the last four 
centuries.”2  In his account of Shakespeare as a poet, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson acknowledges the weight of Shakespeare’s words and 
likens him to “some saint whose history is to be rendered into all 
languages . . . .”3  An author’s connection with his or her audience 
transcends the boundaries of society, time and culture, and 
Shakespeare’s influence through his work is but one illustration of 
the role authors have in society and human life.  The way in which 
Shakespeare’s work and life has molded society’s literary and 
artistic development and cultural formation as a poet and 
playwright in seventeenth-century Elizabethan England and as a 
present-day author who speaks with a contemporary voice that 
resonates with our present and future times4 suggests that there is 
more to the notion of the creative individual and authorship as an 
essentially human activity than that which is presently 
acknowledged within the copyright system. 
Shakespeare, who lived from 1564 to 1616,5 wrote and 
published his works from 1593 to 1609,6 well before the Statute of 
Anne was passed by Parliament in 1710 to recognize literary rights 
in manuscripts.7  The patronage system, wherein authors wrote for 
 
 2 HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY xiii (2d ed. 
1997) [hereinafter BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE]. 
 3 Id. at xvi (“[H]e is like some saint whose history is to be rendered into all languages, 
into verse and prose, into songs and pictures, and cut up into proverbs; so that the 
occasion which gave the saint’s meaning the form of a conversation, or of a prayer, or of 
a code of laws, is immaterial, compared with the universality of its application.”). 
 4 See NORTHROP FRYE, NORTHROP FRYE ON SHAKESPEARE 1 (Robert Sandler ed., 
1986). 
 5 See id. 
 6 HAROLD BLOOM, GENIUS: A MOSAIC OF ONE HUNDRED EXEMPLARY CREATIVE 
MINDS 16–18 (Warner Books 2002) [hereinafter BLOOM, GENIUS]. 
 7 The Statute of Anne was an “Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the 
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times 
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an aristocratic class for financial reward, public recognition and 
protection, was the prevalent method by which authors earned their 
dues.8  Shakespeare, as most playwright authors did in his time, 
depended on this system for his livelihood.9  Authors provided a 
service to their patrons and were rewarded or punished by what 
their works did for their audiences.10  What authors received from 
their patrons was a reward or honor for their service and work, and 
the idea that authors could own their literary and artistic creations 
through property rights did not fit well with the traditional 
patronage system.11 
Shakespeare was a talented dramatist12 and left such a 
pronounced mark on literature that his work continues to speak to 
society with a voice that is still powerful four hundred years 
 
therein mentioned.” Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).  
The Statute of Anne benefited authors to the extent that it allowed authors to acquire the 
copyright in their work that before the statute was the sole prerogative of publishers and 
members of the Stationers’ Company, the London publishing guild. See LYMAN RAY 
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 145 (Vanderbilt Univ. Press 1968) 
[hereinafter PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT]. 
 8 HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES 43 
(Riverhead Books 1994) [hereinafter BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON]. 
 9 Two of Shakespeare’s early poems, Venus and Adonis and The Rape of Lucrece, 
were dedicated to his patron, the Earl of Southampton. See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF 
INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xx.  An outbreak of plague in 1593 or 1594 forced theaters to 
close, and Shakespeare was forced to earn his living through other means. See FRYE, 
supra note 4, at 10. 
 10 Texts were thought to be an action (as opposed to a thing) that would cause 
reactions in those who came in contact with them: 
[Texts might] ennoble or immortalize worthy patrons . . . move 
audiences to laughter or tears . . . expose corruption or confirm the 
just rule of the monarch or assist in the embracing of true religion, in 
which case their authors were worthy of reward . . . [or] move men to 
“sedition and disobedience” or to “detestable heresies” in which case 
their authors deserved punishment. 
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 13 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1993). 
 11 Id. at 17. 
 12 See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xvi.  Emerson describes 
Shakespeare as  
a full man, who liked to talk; a brain exhaling thoughts and images, 
which seeking vent, found the drama next at hand.  Had he been less, 
we should have had to consider how well he filled his place, how 
good a dramatist he was—and he is the best in the world. 
Id. 
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later.13  Being in the patronage system and producing plays, poems 
and sonnets for his patrons, however, had a significant impact on 
what he wrote and produced.  Shakespeare was popular and well 
liked14 but probably refrained from venturing into contemporary 
politics in his works because of censorship15 and the need to court 
favors from patrons.16  Although Harold Bloom suggests that 
Shakespeare’s works resulted from his independent individuality 
and remarkable intellect17 and were not shaped by state power or 
fidelity to his patron,18 the influence that patrons would have had 
 
 13 See id. at xiii. 
 14 FRYE, supra note 4, at 9 (“Shakespeare seems to have been popular and well liked 
both as a person and as a dramatist.  He never engaged in personal feuds, as many of his 
contemporaries did, and his instinct for keeping out of trouble was very agile.”). 
 15 See id. (noting that any play containing references to contemporary politics would 
not be staged). 
 16 See id. at 10 (“Shakespeare seems to have had the instincts of a born courtier: 
Macbeth, for example, would have been just right for James I, who had come to London 
from Scotland a few years earlier.”). 
 17 Harold Bloom, in defining “genius,” refers to Shakespeare several times. See, e.g., 
BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 9–11.  Bloom quoted Thomas Carlyle, the Scottish 
essayist, satirist and historian during the Victorian era, as having remarked, “[i]f called to 
define Shakespeare’s faculty, I should say superiority of intellect.” Id. at 9.  Bloom also 
quotes William Blake as stating “[t]he ages are always equal but genius is always above 
its age.” Id. at 10.  Bloom goes on to state that “[w]e cannot confront the twenty-first 
century without expecting that it too will give us a Stravinsky, or Louis Armstrong, a 
Picasso or Matisse, a Proust or James Joyce.  To hope for a Dante or Shakespeare, a J.S. 
Bach or Mozart, a Michelangelo or Leonardo, is to ask for too much, since gifts that 
enormous are very rare.” Id. 
 18 Some scholars of literary study argue that the social order of the English 
Renaissance period reduced playwrights of that period to time-servers or subverters of 
state power. See BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE, supra note 2, at xvi–xvii.  Harold 
Bloom, arguing against this position, emphasizes the influence Shakespeare had in his 
era: 
Who wrote the text of modern life, Shakespeare or the Elizabethan–
Jacobean political establishment?  Who invented the human, as we 
know it, Shakespeare or the court and its ministers?  Who influenced 
Shakespeare’s actual text more, William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the 
First Secretary to Her Majesty, or Christopher Marlowe? . . . [W]e 
need to assert that high literature is exactly that, an aesthetic 
achievement, and not state propaganda, even if literature can be used, 
has been used, and doubtless will be used to serve the interests of a 
state, or of a social class, or of a religion, or of men against women, 
whites against blacks, Westerners against Easterners. 
Id. at xvii. 
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as the masters or employers of authors19 on the kind of works their 
authors produced would be difficult, if not impossible, to ignore.20  
Sir Thomas Babbington Macaulay was quick to recognize the 
detrimental effect of patronage upon literary and artistic creations.  
In his 1841 parliamentary speech opposing the extension of the 
then copyright term of twenty-eight years, he remarked that he 
could conceive of no system more fatal to the 
integrity and independence of literary men than one 
under which they should be thought to look for their 
daily bread to the favour of ministers and nobles.  I 
can conceive no system more certain to turn those 
minds which are formed by nature to the blessings 
and ornaments of our species into public scandals 
and pests.21 
In his speech, Macaulay goes on to acknowledge the copyright 
system as the “only one resource left” to ensure authors continue to 
 
 19 Jane Bernstein, in writing on print culture and music in sixteenth-century Venice, 
identified patronage to fall into three distinct categories. JANE BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE 
AND MUSIC IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY VENICE 105–06 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).  The first 
and most traditional was one of service to the patron for payment to have a composer’s 
work printed. Id.  The second was a dedication of a work to a potential patron with whom 
a composer was seeking employment. Id.  The third form of patronage moved towards a 
market system where a composer completed a work and sought a patron to dedicate the 
work to in return for payment or favors. Id. 
 20 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright] (“[I]n a world with neither copyright nor 
massive state subsidy, authors would likely rely heavily on private patronage, forcing 
them to cater to the tastes, interests, and political agenda of the wealthy, rather than 
seeking a broader, more varied consumer audience.  Copyright thus serves to support a 
robust, pluralist, and independent sector devoted to the creation and dissemination of 
works of authorship.”); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
79, 83 (1992) (“Patronage supports only those authors whose creative efforts meet the 
patron’s taste.  Patronage depresses authorship by shutting the author off from the wider 
audience that he might hope to reach.”); Alan C. Hutchinson, From Cultural 
Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94 YALE L.J. 209, 223 (1984) (reviewing 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984)) (“With the 
advent of commercial printing and the relative demise of the patronage system, the 
literary community burgeoned . . . .”). 
 21 Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 
5, 1841), in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 310 (Robert Merges & Jane 
Ginsburg eds., 2004). 
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produce literary and artistic works and are remunerated through the 
rights that copyright provides.22 
While the creation of the market for literary and artistic works 
through the copyright system may be the best way to remunerate 
authors for their creativity, the statutory scheme providing property 
rights on utilitarian ideals to meet a larger social goal—that of 
promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”23—removes 
from contemporary copyright jurisprudence the moral and ethical 
considerations necessary to create the ideal conditions for authentic 
authorship to occur and connect authors with society.24  Ronald 
Dworkin, in Law’s Empire, argues that understanding a legal 
system is a matter of making the best interpretative sense of it.25  
Law and its practice, to Professor Dworkin, ought to be construed 
as a general principle of political integrity that comprises various 
social constraints to create equality and provide moral justification 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24 One area of moral and ethical norms that has not been fully explored in copyright is 
the idea that the fundamental human rights of an author ought to be considered as natural 
rights. See generally Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The 
Introduction of Natural Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497 (2004).  Digital media today also facilitates 
authorship by authors, who write and collaborate for personal, social, moral or other 
forms of non-economic rewards that are not a part of the utilitarian calculus for 
copyright. See Erez Rueveni, Authorship in the Age of the Conducer, 54 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 285, 288 (2007).  The present copyright regime also focuses on the external 
commercial value of a work and its dissemination to the widest portion of society without 
much consideration of the intrinsic processes of artistic creation and inspiration. See 
generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension 
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006). 
 25 According to Professor Dworkin: 
General theories of law . . . must be abstract because they aim to 
interpret the main point and structure of legal practice, not some 
particular part or department of it.  But for all their abstraction, they 
are constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a 
whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice 
as they find it and the best justification of that practice. . . .  Legal 
philosophers debate about the general part, the interpretive 
foundation any legal argument must have . . . .  Any practical legal 
argument, no matter how detailed and limited assumes the kind of 
abstract foundation jurisprudence offers, and when rival foundations 
compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects others. 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (Fontana Press 1986). 
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for its political power.26  Conceiving the copyright system as a 
policy of the legislature for economic regulation27 gives rise to the 
need to calibrate the extent of authorial rights against the social 
costs of property rights28 to ensure that the rights provided to 
authors are not more than is necessary to provide the incentive to 
create.29  The difficulty of calibrating costs against benefits 
 
 26 One of the main tenets of law as integrity is that it “supposes that law’s constraints 
benefit society not just by providing predictability or procedural fairness, or in some 
other instrumental way, but by securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes 
their community more genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the 
political power it does.” Id. at 95–96. 
 27 Thomas Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272, 278 (2004) (stating that Congress’s Intellectual Property Power is not limited 
by any general norm and that the exclusive rights provided under copyright law were 
another form of economic regulation that Congress used to confer economic rent on 
favored special interests); see also PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, 143 (stating 
that the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was not meant to benefit authors, but 
was a trade-regulation statute enacted to resolve chaos in the book trade caused by the 
final lapse in 1694 of its predecessor, the Licensing Act of 1662, and to prevent a 
continuation of the booksellers’ monopoly); Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 533 (2004) (“American copyright law has been set on a utilitarian 
foundation . . . [that] constructs copyright as a creature of positive law, by which 
exclusive rights (limited, in their application, by the express constraints set out in the 
Intellectual Property Clause) may be offered, or withheld, on whatever basis is rationally 
calculated to benefit the public.”). 
 28 According to Nachbar: 
The set of rights conferred by intellectual property law is, 
economically, no different than the set of rents resulting from other 
limits on competition.  Both forms of intervention in markets provide 
a set of protections calibrated by both the definition of the market 
they regulate and the scope of their restrictions on free competition to 
provide particular beneficiaries the power to extract from the market 
more than they could get without the limiting regulation. 
Nachbar, supra note 27, at 355. 
 29 Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“The goals of encouraging the creation and dissemination of 
new works require a carefully balanced set of rights given to authors and privileges 
granted to users of copyrighted works.  It must give authors an incentive to create, but it 
must also limit this incentive so that other authors can create new works that build on 
original works.”).  The balance between private incentives and public access is a difficult 
one to draw from a utilitarian standpoint.  Professor Mark A. Lemley states: 
Proliferation of economic literature on intellectual property over the 
last two decades has improved our understanding of the economics of 
innovation and intellectual property considerably, but it has not given 
us a magic bullet or told us where to draw the line between protection 
and the public domain. . . .  The optimal scope, strength, and duration 
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inherent in any utilitarian system of rights,30 the uneasy application 
of property rights in creative works to create an artificial scarcity 
in public goods,31 and the reliance on an imperfect market to 
allocate creative resources efficiently32 characterize a utilitarian-
based conceptualization of the copyright system that justifies the 
 
of intellectual property protection depend on the type of creation at 
issue, on the nature of innovation in the particular industry in 
question, on the particular kind of invention (and inventor) at issue, 
and on the market context. 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1066 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Property].  Professor Christopher S. Yoo states that the 
“[b]asic principles of welfare maximization require that works be priced at marginal cost 
because it is at that point that the social benefits of producing an incremental unit no 
longer exceed the social costs.” Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 227 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 30 There is some difficulty encountered in utilitarianism, which is to balance the 
collective welfare of society against the property rights of authors (creating social costs 
that society bears for the grant of these rights).  Professor Dworkin states: 
Utilitarian arguments encounter a special difficulty that ideal 
arguments do not.  What is meant by average or collective welfare?  
How can the welfare of an individual be measured, even in principle, 
and how can gains in the welfare of different individuals be added 
and then compared with losses, so as to justify the claim that gains 
outweigh losses overall? 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232 (Gerald Duckworth & Co. 1991).  
Using an example of the effect segregation has on welfare, Dworkin states, “[t]he 
utilitarian argument that segregation improves average welfare presupposes that such 
calculations can be made.  But how?” Id.; see also Lemley, Property, supra note 29, at 
1066 (“[I]t is hard—and perhaps even impossible—to ever calibrate intellectual property 
law perfectly.”). 
 31 See Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Reality and 
Restriction on Academic Freedom, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 546–47 (1999) 
(“Because an author can prevent free riders from copying and distributing an author’s 
work without paying copyright royalties, copyright protection creates an artificial scarcity 
in the means of accessing a creative work and gives the copyright owner a monopoly in 
the resulting market for such access.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 32 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 
(1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use] (“Copyright markets will not, however, always 
function adequately.  Though the copyright law has provided a means for excluding 
nonpurchasers and thus has attempted to cure the public goods problem, and though it has 
provided mechanisms to facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be 
exceedingly expensive or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against 
nonpurchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of desirable 
consensual exchanges.  In those cases, the market cannot be relied on to mediate public 
interests in dissemination and private interests in remuneration.” (footnote omitted)). 
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grant of private rights in terms of common good.33  Utilitarianism 
as a basis for copyright jurisprudence, directed towards the 
ultimate goal of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”34 for welfare maximization, however, creates an uncertainty 
as to the proper allocation of entitlements in literary and artistic 
works.  The law, as it presently stands, allows authors to recover 
the cost of investment in creative production from commercial 
markets without any limitations or restraints on the exercise of 
rights.  Authors may seek as much financial remuneration for their 
works through the market for as long as is necessary to provide an 
economic incentive for authors to create and produce works.35  The 
difficulty in identifying the precise point at which entitlements 
should be extended to facilitate an author’s recovery of market 
profits as an incentive to create works for the general public 
benefit36 creates a legal system that subjects rights to collective 
 
 33 See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical 
Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 798–99 (1985) 
(“Utilitarianism is a consequentialist or teleological theory, while libertarianism and 
contractarianism are deontological theories.  The primary difference between these two 
types of ethical theories is that in consequentialist theories rights must always be justified 
in terms of the good, while in deontological theories, at least some rights require no 
justification and may be exercised regardless of their consequences.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 35 Ryan, supra note 31, at 545 (“Incentive theory assumes that creative expression will 
likely be squelched and constricted if authors are not afforded some copyright protection 
to ensure a financial return on the costs of creating and disseminating their original 
works.”); see also Yoo, supra note 29, at 215.  Yoo argues that without rights over 
creative works, third parties will be able to copy and distribute works without incurring 
the first-copy cost borne by authors and will thereby “deprive authors of any reasonable 
prospect of recovering their fixed-cost investments and would thus leave rational authors 
with no economic incentive to invest in the production of creative works.” Id.  The result 
of this situation is an economic inefficiency resulting from monopolistic pricing practices 
as authors price their works at a substantially higher price than their marginal cost of 
production. See William Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1659, 1700–03 (1988). 
 36 For literature on this point, see as examples Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for 
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133 (1999) (“[A] loss of social welfare [from 
copyright] is acceptable up to the point required to induce creation of the work, but not 
beyond.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1197, 1205 (1996) (“[C]opyright protection beyond that necessary to compensate the 
author for lost opportunities would generate no additional incentive to create and would 
discourage production of additional copies . . . .”); Yoo, supra note 29, at 216–17 
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social welfare but which, concurrently, provides very little 
certainty and order in a legal system designed to allocate property 
rights in literary and artistic works.  The copyright system was 
established as a legal institution to provide authors with the 
freedom to produce works of authorship independent of nobility 
and state government patronage.37  Yet, ironically, the copyright 
system produces a new form of patronage—that of the market—
which now subjects authors to commercial forces as their new 
patron. 
A legal system that is intended to provide authors with the 
freedom to create that is independent of patronage would best 
serve its intended purpose by creating the ideal environment that 
would allow authorship to flourish for society’s benefit.  Professor 
Paul Goldstein had earlier conceived of the copyright system as 
concerned solely with authorship, and not the protection of authors 
or publishers, nor the security of author or consumer welfare, the 
bolstering of international trade balances or the protection of art.38  
The law is indeed, as Professor Goldstein succinctly explained, 
about “sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an 
individual to craft out of thin air, an intense, devouring labor, an 
Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane,”39 for 
unless the law creates an environment that would encourage 
authors to create works of authorship that is independent of 
extrinsic forces and influences, society may not have access to 
works that are crafted from an author’s individual and autonomous 
creativity. 
 
(“[C]opyright protection must exist, but should be calibrated to the lowest level that still 
provides sufficient return to support creation of a work.”). 
 37 According to Martha Woodmansee, the English romantic poet William Wordsworth 
believed: 
The [Copyright] Bill has for its main object, to relieve men of letters 
from the thralldom of being forced to court the living generation, to 
aid them in rising above degraded taste and slavish prejudice, and to 
encourage them to rely upon their own impulses, or to leave them 
with less excuse if they should fail to do so. 
MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY 
OF AESTHETICS 145 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994). 
 38 Goldstein, supra note 20, at 302. 
 39 Id. 
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Fitting copyright law within the framework of utilitarianism 
may overemphasize the role of the market as an institution to 
provide economic rewards for authorial labor.40  Utilitarianism 
undermines or ignores other non-economic conditions necessary 
for creative and authentic authorship, such as the ability of authors 
to use creative resources with ease or engage in collaborative 
authorship.41  True authorship in an authentic sense that is 
independent of government subsidies, patrons and the market is 
essentially an activity that can only occur when other individuals 
(authors, readers and publishers) within society are constrained by 
particular moral and ethical norms based on an underlying social 
agreement that provides for the entitlement of rights in creative 
works on ideas of justice and fairness.  Shifting the ethics for 
copyright from a utilitarian-based approach, which justifies 
property rights as necessary to further larger public goals, towards 
 
 40 See Dale A. Nance, Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 764–65 (1990) 
(defining the copyright system as comprising both utilitarian and teleological ideas as 
distinct from one another); Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory 
Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 217, 226–27 
(2003) (describing the economic model for copyright protection developed by William 
Landes and Richard Posner, as a “modern variant of utilitarianism,” in which protection 
furthers “the efficient allocation of resources in a market setting”).  To Professor Nance, 
utilitarianism measures common good by the satisfaction of human preferences without 
judgment on the appropriateness of the preferences. Nance, supra, at 764.  The 
“measurement is done . . . by allowing aggregate preferences to be registered by the 
operation of the market . . . by the demand that is revealed” in the market. Id. at 764–65.  
Professor Nance contrasts teleological theories on the basis that judgments are made on 
the appropriateness of the common good and states that “[i]n the context of intellectual 
property, this would translate into an argument based on the intrinsic values of 
knowledge and aesthetic experience, values deserving governmental support despite, 
indeed because of, the insufficiency of consumer demand, even in a well-functioning 
market.” Id. at 765.  Other scholars treat utilitarianism as a branch of teleological thought. 
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional 
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 
1552 (1982) (citing utilitarianism as a popular theory among teleological scholars); Kurt 
M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 
209, 232 (2006) (“Utilitarianism is the most well-known teleological or consequentialist 
theory of ethical justification.”); Thomas M. Scanlon, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1020, 1047 (1973) (citing utilitarianism as the “principal example” of 
teleological theories). 
 41 Thierry Joffrain, Deriving a (Moral) Right for Creators, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 735, 781 
(2001) (“[M]ore than profit drives the creative process . . . .  The driving force behind 
creativity may be connected to the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of creators.” (footnote omitted)). 
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a natural rights framework, which justifies the grant of rights as 
natural entitlements, allows authorial and social rights in literary 
and artistic works to be allocated on principles of fairness and 
justice.  A conceptualization of the copyright system based on 
natural rights principles rewards authors for their individual 
creativity rather than mere production or economic investment and 
allows creative authorship to occur without relying on the 
commercial market as an institution to allocate entitlements 
between authors and society in the copyright system. 
This Article is divided into three parts.  Part I of this Article 
argues that romanticism as a notion of authorship within the 
copyright system provides an important analytical tool to assess 
the role of authors within society and facilitate our understanding 
of the process of creative authorship.  This part of the Article 
suggests that literary studies on romantic authorship minimize the 
central role of authors in the copyright system and identifies the 
need for a comprehensive understanding of authorial rights vis-à-
vis readers and publishers/distributors in the copyright system.  
Part II builds an ethics for the copyright system on principles of 
natural law and natural rights that is distinct from utilitarianism.  
The main consideration of this part of the Article is the 
acknowledgement that authors and society have natural rights in 
literary and artistic works, which consequently imposes moral 
obligations on authors and their readers on how these works may 
be used.  The use of a deontological framework to guide moral and 
ethical considerations within the copyright system affects the areas 
of property rights and access, the alienability of these rights, 
society’s right to pursue knowledge and excellence, and the moral 
rights of authors.  This part of the Article provides a detailed 
analysis for a copyright ethics that grants rights in creative works 
as natural rights of the author that preclude the necessity of 
drawing references to a larger social or political goal.  Part III 
considers the essence of the social contract theory as a basis to 
allocate rights and entitlements in creative works within society 
and calls for the judiciary to play a greater role in setting these 
rights and entitlements to ensure justice and fairness.  This part of 
the Article also calls for limitations and restraints on the exercise 
of these rights and for entitlements based on contractarianism as 
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espoused by traditional and more contemporary social contract 
philosophers.  The Article concludes that conceiving copyright 
ethics based on natural law and natural rights produces a dynamic 
in the legal system that facilitates a fairer distribution of rights and 
entitlements in creative works among all the parties in the 
copyright system.  If the aim of the copyright system is to 
encourage authentic authorship that is independent of patronage by 
the commercial market, a shift in copyright ethics must occur to 
grant rights and entitlements as a fundamental and natural right of 
the author and to impose simultaneous moral obligations on 
authors to make their works available to society in accordance with 
the social agreement an author has with other members of society. 
I. CONTEXTUALIZING AUTHORSHIP 
In contextualizing authorship within the copyright system, the 
notion of the romantic author immediately comes to the forefront 
of scholarly debate as a notion that is socially constructed as a 
response to the emerging copyright markets of the early sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and is often dismissed by copyright and 
literary studies scholars as an unrealistic representation of how 
authors truly create.  Romanticism as a literary, artistic and 
intellectual movement that emphasizes the individual as a creator, 
who produces creative works from intrinsic human emotion, 
imagination and thought,42 does however show us how authors as 
individuals relate and respond to market and commercial forces 
and teaches an important lesson—that there are a great number of 
works of creative authorship that are not produced for the 
commercial market but which have met great social and readership 
success.  John Milton’s contract for the first publication of 
Paradise Lost provided for a mere payment of £5.00 (five pounds) 
for the publisher’s right to “have hold and enjoy” the manuscript 
 
 42 See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries 
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 25 (2004) (“[The flair of romanticism 
is] related to the individual’s ability and talent to create intellectual goods from 
scratch.”). 
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without interference from the author.43  The publisher, Samuel 
Simmons, required the assurance that Milton, as the author, would 
not “print or cause to be printed or sell dispose or publish the said 
Booke or Manuscript or any other Booke or Manuscript of the 
same tenor or subject.”44  When the contract was signed in 1667,45 
authorship was subject to the control of the state through 
censorship laws governing the printing of books through licenses.46  
In this time, when Charles II returned to the monarchy following 
the English Civil War and the rule of Oliver Cromwell, the 
Licensing Act of 1662 regulated the works of authorship that could 
be printed in order to prevent the printing of “Seditious, 
Treasonable and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets” and for the 
“Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses” as a measure for 
safeguarding the government.47  Authorship was controlled by the 
authorities, and it was several years before a license to print 
Paradise Lost was granted.48  Paradise Lost established Milton as 
“one of the very greatest poets of the modern world.”49  To 
Professor Harold Bloom, Milton, “so palpable a genius that it can 
seem redundant to characterize his gift,”50 authored a 
“magnificent” poem and epic in Paradise Lost.51  Yet Milton, 
writing before romanticism as an intellectual movement took off in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, wrote to express 
his internal turmoil as a blind man who, in prison, faced the death 
 
 43 Milton’s Agreement With Mr. Symons for Paradise Lost (Apr. 27, 1667), in 1 THE 
POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 283 (Samuel Egerton Brydges ed., John Macrone 
1835); ROSE, supra note 10, at 27. 
 44 ROSE, supra note 10, at 27. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Censorship in England was through copyright.  By granting the Stationers’ 
Company, the trade guild comprising bookbinders, booksellers and printers, with the 
right to suppress the printing of prohibited books, the government maintained control of 
the printing presses. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 114–42. 
 47 Id. at 134. 
 48 The authorities were suspicious of John Milton, who had worked for Cromwell’s 
revolutionary government, and who was also excluded from general amnesty when the 
restoration of the monarchy occurred following the fall of Cromwell’s government. 
Harold Bloom, Introduction to JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST xxi–xxvi (Gordon Teskey, 
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2005) (1667). 
 49 Id. at xxvii. 
 50 BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 50. 
 51 Id. at 52. 
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penalty following the fall of Cromwell’s government,52 and 
produced a work of literary and poetic greatness that made a 
significant impact upon society and those who read it.  Yet, 
Paradise Lost was a work that was not influenced by the 
possibility of market commercialization. 
Authorship in this context therefore places the author in a 
unique position as the creator and producer of literary and artistic 
works in the center of the copyright legal system comprising 
authors, readers and the publisher/distributor.  Before a work is put 
before the public, an author must conceive of a work and engage in 
an intricate process of creativity to produce the work.  The 
composition of Paradise Lost as a creative endeavor occurred 
independently of the reading public, who largely regarded Milton 
as a criminal and one guilty of sedition,53 of financial rewards from 
publication and distribution of the book54 or of government 
patronage or control of the work.55  Milton’s authoring of Paradise 
Lost occurred within a set of circumstances so unique to his 
individual situation56 that the form of authorship can be regarded 
 
 52 See id. 
 53 John Milton was thought to be a “political controversialist, as a 
disestablishmentarian (someone who opposes an ‘established’ state-run church), as an 
enemy of bishops and of hireling priests (ministers paid for their work), as a proponent of 
divorce, as a defender of regicide, and as the chief propagandist under the dictatorship of 
Oliver Cromwell”—in short, as a vigorous proponent of everything, so that after 1660, he 
was regarded by many in England as criminal and seditious. MILTON, supra note 48, at 
xxvii. 
 54 Authorial rights over the literary and artistic works were not formed at this point, 
and the market for books was controlled by booksellers and publishers rather than 
authors. ROSE, supra note 10, at 28. 
 55 The composition of Paradise Lost occurred between the start of the downfall of 
Cromwell’s reformation government around 1658 and the restoration of the English 
monarchy to Charles II. MILTON, supra note 48, at xxiii–xxv. 
 56 Paradise Lost was written in part during the fall of Cromwell’s government. Id.  
Nine of the men who signed Charles I’s execution were themselves executed. Id.  Sir 
Henry Vane the Younger, to whom Milton addressed a sonnet in 1652, was also 
executed. Id.  Milton was not among those who were formally excluded from the Act of 
Pardon and could come out of hiding but was later arrested and imprisoned. Id.  Milton’s 
“feelings in this period, which reveal his resolution as an artist and a prophet, are 
recorded in verses from the invocation to Book Seven (lines 24–28) of Paradise Lost.” 
Id. at xxv; see BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 51 (“In 1660, with the Stuart Restoration 
in progress . . . [Milton] went deep into internal exile by composing Paradise Lost.  
Contemplating when young, a Puritan triumph in England, Milton said of the hymns and 
hallelujahs of the saints, ‘some one may perhaps be heard offering at high strains in new 
VOL19_BOOK2_NG 2/26/2009  3:27:18 AM 
2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 429 
as an intrinsic expression of his own artistic soul in his literary 
work and, to borrow Milton’s own words in his speech opposing 
the licensing of the printing of books,57 as a manifestation of his 
“precious life-blood . . . embalmed and treasured up on purpose to 
a life beyond life.”58  Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall refers to 
this form of authorship as a manifestation of an author’s “intrinsic 
dimension of creativity” that is “characterized by spiritual or 
inspirational motivations . . . inherent in the creative task itself” 
and which can be the result of the author’s “desire for challenge, 
personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with a particular 
meaning or significance.”59 
Milton wrote Paradise Lost within the context of his 
experiences in his own society during the fall of the Reformation, 
was influenced by other authors and writers of his time,60 and 
published and distributed his work to the reading public in a 
manner that was uniquely his own.61  Contextualizing authorship 
as the creation and production of a work that manifests an author’s 
unique nature and personality requires a willingness to accept 
authors within the copyright system as autonomous individuals 
possessing natural rights in their work that are separate from 
 
and lofty measures to sing and celebrate.’  What that Song of Triumph would have been 
like, we cannot know, but surmise holds that it would have been a Spenserian romance on 
the Matter of Britain, raised to the ecstasy of a redeemed nation.  Instead, Cromwell dies, 
the Revolution of the Saints failed, and blind Milton composed Paradise Lost.”). 
 57 John Milton, Areopagitica (1664), A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing 
to the Parliament of England, in MILTON, supra note 48, at 339. 
 58 Milton considered books to contain the soul of the author.  He states: 
books are not absolutely dead things . . . .  [They] contain a potency 
of life in them to be as active as the soul was whose progeny they are 
. . . .  [T]hey do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction 
of that living intellect that bred them . . . [and] he who destroys a 
good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God . . . .  
Id. at 342. 
 59 Kwall, supra note 24, at 1945. 
 60 The character of Satan and Lucifer in Milton’s Paradise Lost, for example, was 
influenced by Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare. BLOOM, THE WESTERN 
CANON, supra note 8, at 158–70. 
 61 Paradise Lost was an immediate success when it was published in 1667. MILTON, 
supra note 48, at xxvi.  It was mentioned in Parliament, given the highest praise by John 
Dryden, the English poet, dramatist and critic and sold well. Id.  Milton’s readers who 
were “implacably hostile to Milton on political grounds,” had also acknowledged “the 
poem’s greatness.” Id. 
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economic rights to print, publish and distribute works.  In this 
sense of authorship, authors independent of publishers and printers 
of their work are able to enter into and agree to be bound to a 
social contract that provides for the fair allocation of entitlements 
in literary and artistic works within a civil society. 
A. The Romantic Author 
In literary studies and copyright jurisprudence, the romantic 
author is an author, who by a sudden stroke of genius, creates a 
new and original piece of work independently.62  He or she 
represents the creative genius in romanticism who has the 
brilliance, ability and talent to produce new works out of thin air63 
and embodies the romantic ideals of “originality, organic form, and 
the [conception] of the work of art as the expression of the unique 
personality of the artist”64 in human form.  In literary studies and 
copyright jurisprudence, this idea of the romantic author is not well 
accepted by many scholars in both fields for two primary reasons.  
The first reason given by scholars is that most authors build upon 
the works of other authors and are not always entirely original in 
the works that they create.65  To adopt a romantic model of 
 
 62 Depoorter, supra note 42, at 25. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (1992). 
 65 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1010–11 (1990) 
[hereinafter Litman, The Public Domain] (“An author, be she writer, composer, or 
sculptor, seeks to communicate her own expression of the world.  Her views of the world 
are shaped by her experiences, by the other works of authorship she has absorbed (which 
are also her experiences), and by the interaction between the two.  Her brain has not 
organized all of this into neat, separable piles entitled ‘things that happened to me,’ 
‘things I read once,’ and ‘things I thought up in a vacuum’ to enable her to draw the 
elements of her works of authorship from the correct pile.  She did not, after all, 
experience them so discretely.  A snatch of a tune she heard was infected by the shape of 
the place where she was sitting when she heard it; her sense of a pattern she saw was 
colored by that day’s weather; a conversation she overheard was tainted by the book that 
she was reading at the time.  Her memories of the song, the pattern, the conversation, 
filtered through her experience, may in fact seem quite unlike the objects she believes 
they represent.  The counterpoint between a sound from one memory and a smell from 
another may express something quite different from what either seems to say alone.  But 
when the author mines the raw material for her next work, significant portions of it will 
be the stuff of the outside world mediated by her experience.  It is unsurprising, then, that 
parts of her work will echo the works of others.”). 
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authorship for the copyright system when authors are, in reality, 
heavily influenced by their external conditions and experiences 
would be a “disservice” to authors.66  In producing new works, 
authors also collaborate with co-authors and with the general 
public in collaborative projects facilitated by the Internet and 
online technologies such as Wikipedia,67 and are therefore not the 
solitary individual geniuses creating works in recluse and isolation 
that the romantic notion of authorship seems to uphold.68  The 
second reason given by scholars against the romantic author is that 
relying on the idea of romantic authorship and originality to 
provide and expand property rights in literary and artistic works,69 
when applied to the regulation of information in situations far from 
the ambit of intellectual property,70 entrenches the romantic author 
and the idea of individual originality into the copyright system,71 
devalues information sources such as genetic information,72 
 
 66 See id. at 1011 (“All works of authorship, even the most creative, include some 
elements adapted from raw material that the author first encountered in someone else’s 
works.”). 
 67 Wikipedia is a collaborative free online encyclopedia. See Wikipedia, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page. 
 68 Lior Zemer, The Copyright Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247, 310 (2006). 
 69 James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and 
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1992) (“The rise of this powerful (and 
historically contingent) stereotype [of the genius whose style forever expresses a single 
unique persona] provided the necessary raw material to fashion some convincing 
mediation of the tension between the imagery of public and private in information 
production.”).  The idea of the romantic author provided the conceptual, moral and 
philosophical justification for giving authors property rights. Id. 
 70 Professor Boyle argues that the idea of originality, stemming from the notion of 
romantic authorship, can be seen to have influenced legal scholarship on blackmail, 
insider trading and case law on the protection of genetic information. Id. at 1470–520. 
 71 The romantic author is a “socially constructed and historically contingent” idea that 
is necessary to resolve the tensions of granting property rights over information in the 
public sphere. Id. at 1525.  The “figure of the romantic author, the associated theme of 
originality and the conceptual distinction between idea and expression” reduces these 
tensions. Id. at 1525–26. 
 72 Professor Boyle provides the example of the rosy-periwinkle plant of Madagascar 
used by indigenous tribes to cure diabetes. See id. at 1530–31.  It was used by a 
pharmaceutical company to manufacture a drug for chemotherapy treatment and “yielded 
a drug to cure Hodgkin’s disease and a trade in the drug worth $100m a year.” Id.  
However, Madagascar, “without an income from its huge biological wealth . . . has 
chopped down most of its forests to feed its people.” Id.  As the country could “find no 
place in a legal regime constructed around a vision of individual, transformative, original 
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marginalizes the protection of information that does not fit the 
romantic model of authorship from misappropriation73 and ignores 
non-individualistic cultural production.74  The romantic notion of 
authorship is therefore seen as a justification for “exclusive 
monopoly-type rights” that disables the ability to recognize non-
authorial-type sources of information and discounts other forms of 
authorship and downstream uses of works, and ought to be 
properly accounted for in the copyright system if it is to be 
“criticized and reformulated.”75 
The accuracy of this contextualization of the romantic author 
and this basis for objecting to the notion of the individual author as 
an independent creator in the copyright system may however be 
questioned, for an insistence on authorship that is independent and 
uninfluenced by the works of others in order for an author to be 
properly recognized as an individual creator is misleading.  The 
influence of other authors and works of authorship, as well as 
existing works or external experiences and perceptions, upon an 
author does not make the author less autonomous, original or 
creative.  The best and most talented authors are influenced in one 
way or the other by other authors, and it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for authors to write and create without any form of 
influence, or inspiration by, the works of others.76  William 
 
genius, the indigenous peoples are driven to deforestation, or slash-and-burn farming.” 
Id. 
 73 Professor Jaszi cites the case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services 
Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), as an example of this form of marginalization where the 
Supreme Court decided that facts are not in themselves protected by copyright. Jaszi, 
supra note 64, at 301–02.  The only way copyright protection will be provided is if those 
facts are arranged in a way that is original and “founded in the creative powers of the 
mind.” Id. 
 74 Professor Jaszi explains that “[c]opyright law, with its emphasis on rewarding and 
safeguarding ‘originality,’ has lost sight of the cultural value of what might be called  
‘serial collaborations’—works resulting from successive elaborations of an idea or text 
by a series of creative workers, occurring perhaps over years or decades.” Id. at 304. 
 75 Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience “Recoding” Rights—
Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the 
Fiction of the Work,” 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 823 (1993). 
 76 Professor Bloom speaks about the “anxiety of influence” on an author as the author 
reads a literary work and explains the influence authors have on each other by stating:  
[w]ithout Keats’s reading of Shakespeare, Milton and Woodsworth, 
we could not have Keats’s odes and sonnets and his two Hyperions.  
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Shakespeare, for example, was influenced by Christopher 
Marlowe,77 and John Milton, by both Shakespeare and Marlowe.78  
Yet their works have had a pronounced effect on society, and both 
Shakespeare and Milton are referred to as the embodiment of 
geniuses.79  An author’s genius may be measured not only by the 
romantic notion of originality and creativity but also by the value 
society places on his or her work by the benefit and enrichment it 
confers on its readers (for literature), listeners (for music) or 
viewers (for art).80  This idea that “genius,”81 present in the 
romantic author, may be measured by both originality and 
creativity as well as social enrichment puts the notion of the 
romantic author in a different copyright context that recognizes 
various stages of creativity, originality and social value that are, in 
reality, attached to a work of authorship.  The recognition of 
varying stages of creativity and originality, as well as social value 
for a work, removes the author as a mere social construct, devised 
to justify the grant of property rights over public information, and 
puts the notion of original authorship at the center of the copyright 
system to provide the basis for granting entitlements in literary and 
artistic works according to the varying stages of creativity and 
originality, as well as the social value of a work, on natural law 
principles of fairness and justice. 
 
Without Tennyson’s reading of Keats, we would have almost no 
Tennyson.  Wallace Stevens, hostile to all suggestions that he owed 
anything to his reading of precursor poets, would have left us nothing 
of value but for Walt Whitman, whom Stevens sometimes scorned, 
almost never overtly imitated, yet uncannily resurrected . . . .  
Bloom, supra note 2, at xxiii. 
 77 Id. at xxi. 
 78 Milton’s Lucifer and Satan in Paradise Lost were influenced by the work of 
Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare respectively. See BLOOM, THE WESTERN 
CANON, supra note 8, at 166. 
 79 BLOOM, GENIUS, supra note 6, at 15–30 (discussing Shakespeare), 45–57 (discussing 
Milton). 
 80 Professor Bloom explains that to “confront the extraordinary in a book—be it the 
Bible, Plato, Shakespeare, Dante, Proust—is to benefit almost without cost.  Genius, in 
its writing, is our best path for reaching wisdom . . . the true use of literature for life.” Id. 
at 4–5.  He goes on to state a person’s “deepest desire is for survival, whether in the here 
and now, or transcendentally elsewhere,” and that “[t]o be augmented by the genius of 
others is to enhance the possibilities of survival, at least in the present and the near 
future.” Id. 
 81 Id. 
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The second critique against the romantic author, that the notion 
of the individual genius is used to justify the expansion of property 
rights,82 is also a weak critique against the notion of the individual 
creator as the locus of authorship and creativity in the copyright 
system, for the expansion of property rights is an affirmation of 
market influence on the creation and production of literary and 
artistic works as opposed to the individual author or creator.  The 
law of intellectual property cannot be explained by the notion of 
the romantic author, and the idea of the individual creator is 
indeed, in many ways, “affirmatively inimical” to the law of 
intellectual property.83  As Professor Ben Depoorter rightly points 
out, there is no link showing “an increased romantic conception 
over time to the expanding reaction of intellectual property law.”84  
The expansion of property rights in intellectual property is a result 
of “changes in economic values that stem from the development of 
new technology and the opening up of new markets.”85  Identifying 
romantic authorship as the basis for granting entitlements in 
literary and artistic works to authors, whose incentives to create are 
 
 82 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 83 Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
873, 882–85 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)).  Professor Lemley goes 
on to explain that the idea of romantic authorship may be invoked to demand strong 
copyright for first-generation authors and for a wider interpretation of fair use for “a 
second-generation author who has ‘transformed’ a first-generation work” and that “[i]n 
practice, the rhetoric of romantic authorship seems to be largely unrelated to the legal 
rules that govern these cases.” Id. at 885. 
 84 See Depoorter, supra note 42, at 26.  Depoorter argues that the expansion of the 
intellectual property system is not a result of a “romantic conception of authorship”: 
For the argument to be upheld, an historical explanation needs to link 
an increased romantic conception over time to the expanding reaction 
of intellectual property law.  It is questionable whether such a 
continued rise in the romantic conception of authorship over time has 
occurred.  To the contrary, the economic reality of today’s 
intellectual property laws, perhaps best exemplified by the rise of 
corporate copyright ownership and the transfer of employee 
inventions to employers, conflicts with ‘author- or inventor-centrism’ 
and romantic notions of authorship.  In another view, the conception 
of authorship is in itself troublesome.  If we concede to the 
deconstructionist viewpoint, authorship is suspect since texts are 
unstable and originality is inherently problematic. 
Id. 
 85 Id. at 28. 
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intrinsic and not dependent on the commercial market for literary 
and artistic works, is therefore unlikely to give rise to increased 
property rights in the present conception of the copyright system 
where individual rights serve collective welfare maximization and 
social good.  The conception of copyright on utilitarian principles 
perceives property rights as a statutory grant to further the public 
interest, deemphasizes the natural rights that an author ought to 
have by virtue of his or her originality and creativity86 and finds 
the notion of the romantic author to have very little relevance in 
granting entitlements and calibrating rights among parties in the 
copyright system. 
However, a conception of the copyright system based on 
deontological ethics seeking to encourage authorship that is 
independent of patronage, government subsidy and the market 
necessitates the central presence of the romantic author in the 
copyright system.  While the notion of the romantic author gives 
authors, as original creators of a work, entitlements in literary and 
artistic works on the basis of fairness and justice and may 
introduce moral and ethical restraints and limitations on the 
exercise of these rights as a social agreement authors enter into in a 
well-ordered civil society, the notion also serves to encourage the 
production of works of authentic authorship that manifests an 
author’s expression of individual personality in a way that 
facilitates a diversity in literary and artistic works that are publicly 
available.  Utilitarian philosophy underlying the present copyright 
system grants rights to authors to allow society to pursue larger 
goals, such as “the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”87 and 
 
 86 Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the 
Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 367–68 (2004) 
(“The utilitarian, or public benefit, rationale of copyright law (the ‘public benefit 
rationale’) suggests that copyright protection exists to encourage the creation of works 
and public access to those works. . . .  [C]opyright law provides an incentive, in the form 
of a limited monopoly, for authors to create works . . . [that] is balanced against the 
public’s need for access to the work. . . .  [C]opyright is a grant or privilege created by 
statute, which can then be altered and limited by statute.”); see also PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 198.  Patterson contends that the “tone” of the Copyright Act 
of 1790 is “completely different from that of the states’ acts and the constitutional 
provision.  The ideas of protecting the author and promoting learning have become 
subordinated to the ideas that copyright is a government grant and a monopoly.” Id. 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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design these rights to achieve the maximum level of authorial 
productivity that will allow for the greatest distribution of a work 
within society.88  The utilitarian system requires only a minimal 
amount of authorial creativity in the production of the work89 and 
undermines highly original and creative contributions that the 
romantic author may make to society by creatively producing 
socially valuable and enriching pieces of literature or artistic 
works. 
The recognition of natural rights in literary and artistic works 
based on an author’s originality and creativity and the social value 
of a work liberates authors to freely create without setting limits to 
their creativity and originality defined by that which appeals to the 
widest segment of society, and encourages the creation of works 
that are highly original and creative and that bring value to and 
enrich society.  Romantic authorship places authors in the center of 
the copyright system as the owners of initial entitlements in literary 
and artistic works, not merely as a social construct that is 
historically contingent on the development of the commercial 
market for literary and artistic works,90 but as individuals within a 
 
 88 Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20, at 309.  Professor Netanel defines this 
philosophy of copyright as a “neoclassicist approach,” where “copyright is primarily a 
mechanism for market facilitation, for moving existing creative works to their highest 
socially valued uses.” Id.  He goes on: 
Copyright can best serve this goal, neoclassicism suggests, by 
enabling copyright owners to realize the full profit potential for their 
works in the market.  In maximizing their profit, neoclassicists argue, 
copyright owners will both rationalize the ‘development’ of existing 
creative works and sell exploitation entitlements to those who are 
best able to satisfy public tastes. 
Id. 
 89 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–51 (1902).  
According to Justice Holmes: 
[A] very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is 
one man’s alone.  That something he may copyright unless there is a 
restriction in the words of the [Copyright] [A]ct. . . .  It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. 
Id. 
 90 See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1329 (“Literary accounts of romantic 
authorship . . . in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, together with the emergent private 
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legal system seeking “To promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts”91 by encouraging authorship that is highly original and 
creative and that brings value and enrichment to society.  The 
notion of the highly original and creative romantic author, who 
produces works that transcend time and cultures, provides authors 
with a sound basis for acquiring legal entitlements to works that 
copyright jurisprudence has yet to accept as being based on an 
author’s natural rights in works of authorship.  The next part of the 
discussion on authorship evaluates the emergence of the author in 
the copyright system and asserts that the construction of the author 
to serve the growing commercial market for literary and artistic 
works, rather than the acceptance of the author as an individual 
making original and creative contributions to society through the 
creation, publication and dissemination of a work, mistakenly 
relies on the market as the institution to encourage creative and 
artistic production.  The market, while facilitating consensual 
exchanges of property rights in literary and artistic works to reward 
authors to some extent, discourages the creation of highly original 
and creative works of authorship that are enriching and of value to 
society. 
B. Authorship in Copyright Jurisprudence 
Contemporary copyright scholarship on authorship presents the 
author as a socially constructed figure that lacks precise or definite 
meaning.92  Martha Woodmansee calls the author a “recent 
invention”93 that was conceived to elevate the status of writers as 
 
sphere of the marketplace and civil society, provided a framework to begin speaking of 
the ‘private property’ of authors, which was underwritten by their ‘originality’ and 
protected via copyright law.  The possibility that an ‘original’ idea of an author might be 
possessable as ‘property’ entered copyright through the discourse of romantic 
authorship.”); Boyle, supra note 69, at 1462 (“Encouraged by an enormous reading 
public, by several apocryphal tales of writers who were household names yet still lived in 
poverty, and by a new, more romantic vision of authorship, writers began to demand 
greater economic returns from their labors.  One obvious strategy was to lobby for some 
kind of legal right in the text—the right that we would call copyright.”). 
 91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 92 See Zemer, supra note 68, at 251.  Zemer notes that contemporary scholarship on 
authorship convincingly argues that the “author is deconstructed into a vessel through 
which many influences and experiences are poured.” Id. 
 93 WOODMANSEE, supra note 37, at 36. 
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craftsmen by labeling them geniuses who do something that is 
“utterly new, unprecedented, or . . . produces something that never 
existed before.”94  By bearing the mark of a genius author, instead 
of a working craftsman, German writers during the Renaissance 
period in the eighteenth century could establish ownership over the 
products of their labor and justify the recognition of legal rights in 
works in the form of copyright law.95  The English poet Edward 
Young, in his Conjectures of Original Composition, perceived of 
the revered author as one whose work “stand[s] distinguished,” and 
in which he has the “sole property” that alone can “confer the 
noble title of an author[,] that is, of one who . . . thinks and 
composes[,] while other invaders of the press, how voluminous 
and learned soever . . . only read and write.”96  The idea of the 
author as a creative genius therefore was a way by which writers of 
literary works could obtain status and wealth without the aid of 
their patrons by selling their works to the reading public through 
the commercial market for books.97  Mark Rose affirms this 
conception of the author as a social construct and refers to the 
author as a “cultural formation” that is “inseparable from the 
commodification of literature.”98  Professor Rose proposes 
proprietorship as the identifying mark on the modern author that 
represents the person who is the “originator and therefore the 
owner of a special kind of commodity, the work.”99  This special 
relationship between author and the work establishes a link 
between originality and ownership that provides the foundation for 
the copyright system, which had developed as a response to the 
printing press, the individual and romantic author, and the 
commercial marketplace,100 and to allocate legal entitlements in 
 
 94 Id. at 39. 
 95 Id. at 36, 39. 
 96 Id. at 39. 
 97 See id. at 37. 
 98 ROSE, supra note 10, at 1. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 3 (“[C]opyright [is] the practice of securing marketable rights in texts that are 
treated as commodities [and is a] specifically modern institution, the creature of the 
printing press, the individualization of authorship in the later Middle Ages and early 
Renaissance, and the development of the advanced marketplace in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.”). 
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literary and artistic works by “drawing lines between works” and 
“where one text ends and another begins.”101 
It is unclear if this conception of the romantic author as an 
individual creative genius truly obscures copyright jurisprudence 
on the process of authorship and blinds the law to the reality of 
creative and cultural production in the copyright system, as literary 
thinkers suggest.  Northorp Frye pointed out that literary works are 
seldom independently created works that bear no relation to 
already existing works.102  Literature is never isolated as an 
individual piece of work that is not an imitation of other works, 
and to Professor Frye, it would be a pretension for the copyright 
system to treat all art works as “an invention distinctive enough to 
be patented,”103 for 
[t]his state of things makes it difficult to appraise a 
literature which includes Chaucer, much of whose 
poetry is translated or paraphrased from others; 
Shakespeare, whose plays sometimes follow their 
sources almost verbatim; and Milton, who asked for 
nothing better than to steal as much as possible out 
of the Bible.104 
It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the lone 
poet, sitting with a pencil and a few blank pieces of paper, 
producing a poem “ex nihilo,” or “from nothing,”105 as an image 
representing how creative works of authorship are produced.  The 
critique literary thinkers have against this image of the romantic 
author is its failure to reflect the reality that creative production is a 
process of using existing works, reinterpreting the work and 
incorporating its idea into a new work or form of expression.  The 
primary concern with the use of this notion of romantic authorship 
as a basis for the grant of rights in creative works through the 
copyright system is that the law will make it difficult for authors to 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 See NORTHROP FRYE, AN ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 97 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957). 
 103 Id. at 96. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 97. 
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use the works of other authors in their creation of new works by 
creating legal barriers to accessing existing works of authorship.106 
However, access barriers to other forms of copyrighted works 
arise from property rights, granted as an incentive to create, that 
allow authors to commercialize their work on the market for 
economic rewards, and which are not in any way related to the 
notion of the romantic author.  Access barriers exist as a legal 
protection to prevent non-paying members of society from using a 
work by creating an artificial scarcity needed to make a work 
marketable as a commodity and to provide authors with economic 
rewards for their work within a utilitarian-based copyright 
system.107  Property rights are therefore a utilitarian legal measure 
used to encourage the production of literary and artistic works for 
the greater good of society108 by maximizing social welfare and 
redistributing wealth through market institutions in the system.109  
 
 106 Id. at 98 (“The copyright law, and the mores attached to it, make it difficult for a 
modern novelist to steal anything except his title from the rest of literature . . . .”). 
 107 Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital 
Copyright, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 126 (2004) (“‘[D]eadweight loss[]’ . . . [is] the 
principal cost of enforcing scarcity in a good which is otherwise available in 
abundance.”); Ryan, supra note 31, at 545–47 (“Because an author can prevent free riders 
from copying and distributing an author’s work without paying copyright royalties, 
copyright protection creates an artificial scarcity in the means of accessing a creative 
work and gives the copyright owner a monopoly in the resulting market for such 
access.”). 
 108 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 100 (1997) (“Copyright monopoly induces production of 
information by allowing non-payers to be excluded and information to be marketed at a 
monopoly price.  At the same time, however, copyright law limits this monopoly to serve 
the ultimate purpose of maximizing access to information.  The law thus regulates access 
to information by balancing incentives to create and accessibility of information.”); 
Kreiss, supra note 29, at 7–8 (“In copyright theory, the more works that are disseminated, 
the more this goal [of promoting the Progress of Science] is advanced. . . .  [T]he rights 
given to copyright authors are a means to an end rather than an end in itself. . . .  ‘[T]he 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.’” (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 109 Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of 
Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 869 (2007) (“Property rights, 
as defined and enforced by legal institutions, may facilitate the definition of wealth or 
welfare. . . .  [T]he structure of markets will also determine how wealth or welfare is both 
defined and allocated.  For example, in a perfectly competitive market, buyers and sellers 
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Professor Frye’s concern that new authors will not have access to 
expressions in existing works, which are a natural part of the 
literary and artistic culture and are used to inspire the creation of 
new works and in expressing new thoughts, is a consequence of 
expanding property rights in creative works from a perceived 
tragedy of the commons,110 which posits that commonly held open 
resources, such as information, will be depleted through overuse 
and underinvestment by the public.111  The resulting expansion of 
property rights in information is a counter-tragedy on the opposite 
side of the coin, known commonly to property and intellectual 
property scholars as the “tragedy of the anticommons,”112 that, 
when applied to intellectual property law, reveals the susceptibility 
of information, which includes literary and artistic works, toward 
over-propertization, under-use and inaccessibility.113 
 
respond solely to price signals, and price adjusts to allocate resources based on buyers’ 
willingness to pay and sellers’ willingness to accept.”). 
 110 The “Tragedy of the Commons” was explored in an article written by Garrett 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  Here, the use of the 
word “commons” is an “open access” to a common resource that is not to be confused 
with a “common pool resource” that is not prone to depletion due to common resource 
management. Carol Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain, and History in the New Law and 
Economics of Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 480–81 (2000). 
 111 Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–43 (2004) (discussing the nature and origin of the tragedy of the 
commons as an argument to prevent the overuse of information and seek stronger and 
perpetual property rights in information). 
 112 Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1988).  The tragedy of the anticommons 
occurs when resources are underused as opposed to overuse in the tragedy of the 
commons.  When multiple owners are given the right to exclude others from a scarce 
resource without giving anyone the effective privilege of use, the tragedy of the 
anticommons will result.  Professor Heller uses empty Moscow store fronts in a state-
controlled (as opposed to a market facilitated) property system as a paradigm of the 
anticommons. Id. at 622–25.  For discussion of the tragedy of the commons in relation to 
the concept of the anticommons in property law, see Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest 
Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 933–40 (2004), and also see ROSE, supra note 10.  
The tragedy of the anticommons has also been applied to the fragmentation that property 
rights will cause over the use of information on the Internet, which will result in greater 
transaction costs to clear rights and prevent the development of new information or 
knowledge. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons, 
91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 511–12 (2003). 
 113 Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 997–98 (1997).  Intellectual property rights limit access to and use of old 
works for improvement.  Professor Lemley explains that:  
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The propensity of property rights to create access barriers to 
information is the primary reason why markets may not efficiently 
allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works, resulting in the 
inaccessibility to works that conventional literary thinking 
mistakenly attributes to the notion of the romantic author and the 
requirement for “originality” and “creativity” in the production of 
a work.114  Markets are imperfect and sometimes fail for various 
reasons.  Sometimes, it may be too expensive for new authors to 
negotiate for use of a work (transaction costs for obtaining 
permission may be too high), it may be too difficult for authors to 
enforce the law against those who infringe their rights, or market 
deficiencies may preclude consensual exchanges between authors 
in the copyright system.115  Relying on the market to efficiently 
allocate entitlements to creative works and provide economic 
 
[t]he creators of old works can, if they choose, refuse to distribute 
them to anyone at all, at any price, during the duration of intellectual 
property protection. . . .  [T]hey can and do exercise control over who 
can use their creation, the purposes for which they can use it, and the 
price they must pay . . . [and] use these rights not only to obtain a 
return on their investment in research and development, but also to 
exercise content control over subsequent uses of their works or to 
prevent the development of a competitive market for their products. 
Id.; see also Hunter, supra note 112, at 511 (stating that gene patents contribute to the 
anticommons by blocking innovative uses of gene fragments and prevent the recognition 
that better uses are possible). 
 114 Anna Nimus, Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anti-Commons (2006), 
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html. 
 115 Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 32, at 1613.  Professor Gordon argues that the 
judiciary should consider use of a work to be fair use when a defendant to an 
infringement claim could not purchase the right to use the work through the market, 
allowing the use of the work would serve the public interest and there would be no 
substantial impairment to the copyright owner’s incentives. Id. at 1601.  On the point of 
market failures, Professor Gordon states: 
Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately.  
Though the copyright law has provided a means for excluding 
nonpurchasers and thus has attempted to cure the public goods 
problem, and though it has provided mechanisms to facilitate 
consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be exceedingly 
expensive or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against 
nonpurchasers, or other market flaws might preclude achievement of 
desirable consensual exchanges.  In those cases, the market cannot be 
relied on to mediate public interests in dissemination and private 
interests in remuneration. 
Id. at 1613. 
VOL19_BOOK2_NG 2/26/2009  3:27:18 AM 
2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 443 
rewards to authors fails to produce the kind of works that authentic 
authorship guarantees with the recognition of the romantic author 
as a creative individual, producing literature and art within a well-
ordered copyright society.116  The realization that the market 
cannot support authentic expressions of authorship occurred to 
German poet, philosopher, historian and dramatist Friedrich von 
Schiller, the hard way.117  When breaking away from the patronage 
of the Duke of Württemberg to be a professional author, Schiller 
had referred to the public as being “everything” to him and exalted 
in the grandiosity of authorship that came from “appealing to no 
other throne than the human spirit.”118 
However, the market turned out to be a difficult patron in 
giving rewards for original creative expressions of the human 
spirit, as Schiller, who became deep in financial debt, later found 
out as he stated that “the German public forces its writers to choose 
according to commercial calculations rather than the dictates of 
genius.  I shall devote all my energies to this Thalia, but I won’t 
deny that I would have employed them in another sphere if my 
condition placed me beyond business considerations.”119  
Eventually, in accepting a pension from Prince Friedrich Christian 
von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg a decade later, 
Schiller stated that it is “impossible in the German world of letters 
to satisfy the strict demands of art and simultaneously procure the 
minimum support for one’s industry.”120  Putting the market and 
the common good before the recognizing of the inherent rights of 
authors in their creations in classical utilitarian thinking121 affirms 
 
 116 WOODMANSEE, supra note 37, at 41–42. 
 117 Id. at 40–41. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 80.  For a detailed treatment of Schiller’s experience with the reading public 
and the commercial market, see id. at 59–86. 
 120 Id. at 41. 
 121 Professor Rawls explains this idea in Lectures of the History of Moral Philosophy: 
[C]lassical utilitarianism starts with a conception of the good—as 
pleasure, or as happiness, or as the satisfaction of desire, preferences, 
or interests; and it may also impose the condition that these desires, 
preferences, or interests be rational . . . in a teleological doctrine, a 
conception of the good is given prior to and independently of the 
right (or the moral law); thus, for example, utilitarianism defines the 
right as maximizing the good (say, as happiness or the satisfaction of 
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the market as the patron for authorship, undermines the process of 
authorial creativity and defeats the purpose of the copyright system 
to encourage the creation of literary and artistic works for the 
benefit of society by compelling authors to produce creative works 
that appeal to the preferences of the commercial market.122  By 
conceiving the author as a social construction responding to the 
emerging commercial market for books, literary scholarship 
discards an important concept in copyright jurisprudence that may 
be used to fairly allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works 
and that is independent of market dynamics.  For example, the use 
of Ernest Hemingway’s conversational anecdotes, reminiscences, 
literary opinions and comments on some of his fictional characters 
in an independently published work of authorship by a less well-
known author and friend, A. E. Hotchner, ought to be recognized 
as a separate work of authorship that did not affect the market for 
other literary creations by Hemingway when the raw materials 
used in creating the work were obtained with the consent and 
approval of Hemingway.123 
Authentic authorship occurs when a fair and just distribution of 
entitlements can be made among all parties in the copyright 
system.  Utilitarian-based copyright systems that emphasize the 
institution of the market to facilitate resource allocation offer an 
unstable foundation for providing fairness and justice in the 
distribution of legal entitlements among authors, readers and 
publishers/distributors.  There are many contributing factors that 
 
rational preferences), and moral worth of character as having, say, a 
character that can be relied on to lead us to do what is right. 
JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 222 (Barbara Herman 
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2000). 
 122 Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20, at 309.  Professor Netanel explains that with 
neoclassicist (the approach to copyright that favors expansion of property rights in 
literary and artistic works) economics, copyright is a mechanism for copyright owners to 
put “existing creative works to their highest socially valued uses” and “realize the full 
profit potential for their works in the market.” Id.  Copyright’s purpose is to determine 
the worth of creative works and provide a guide for resource allocation rather than ensure 
that authors have the incentives to create. Id. 
 123 Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 256 (N.Y. 1968).  In this 
case, the New York Court of Appeals decided that Hotchner could draw freely from his 
conversations with Hemingway to write and publish articles about him where these 
materials were obtained through consent. Id. at 255–56. 
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encourage creativity and the production of literary works.  The 
unique creative process of authorship that occurs with each 
individual author produces so diverse an assemblage of literary and 
artistic works within society that it would be unfair and unjust to 
assume that all forms of creative works may be valued by the 
commercial market’s sole valuation of creative works.  Our 
musical experience of Mozart is very different from our musical 
experience of Bob Dylan, and it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to value these different composers and their musical 
compositions by way of a single metric unit124—that of social 
progress in “Science and useful Arts”125—in the case for copyright.  
The fact that creative works may have economic value on the 
market does not lessen the importance of the author figure and the 
notion of romantic authorship as notions that give rise to the 
recognition of natural rights that are separate and incommensurable 
with economic rights over works.  Collective works and 
copyrighted works of corporate ownership are valued differently 
 
 124 Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
799–800 (1994).  Professor Sunstein explores the claims that human values are plural and 
diverse (i.e., not reducible to some larger and more encompassing value) and human 
goods are not commensurable (i.e., assessable along a single metric), and emphasizes the 
need for legal scholars to regard the notion of incommensurability of human goods as 
requiring sustained interest for legal systems to function well. Id. at 780, 861.  On the 
point of music valuation, Professor Sunstein asks that we: 
Consider the suggestion that a single metric is available with which 
to align our different kinds of valuation.  For example, Mozart may 
be valued in a different way from Bob Dylan, but there may be a 
metric by which to value different composers; and, along that metric, 
Mozart may be superior to Dylan.  (I believe that any such metric 
would be false to our experience of music, and hence I do not think 
that this sort of approach will work; but I am trying here to show how 
the two claims might be separated.)  In any case some people think 
that there are diverse values—pleasure from a warm sun, gratitude 
from unexpected kindness, and so forth—while also believing that 
these can all be reduced to a general concept like utility, happiness, or 
pleasure.  Utilitarians need not deny the diversity of human goods, or 
that pleasures and pains come in different forms.  The claim of 
incommensurability is that no unitary metric accounts for how we 
actually think and that the effort to introduce one misdescribes 
experience . . . [and] that the misdescription can yield both inaccurate 
predictions and bad recommendations for ethics and politics. 
Id. at 799–800. 
 125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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from the works of individual authors in terms of economic, social 
or communal, rather than personal, value,126 but it would be a 
shortcoming of copyright jurisprudence to relegate the romantic 
author and its notion of authorship to mere social constructs 
responding to an emerging commercial market for creative works.  
By denying authors and the process of creative authorship their due 
recognition as separate and distinct non-economic notions, we may 
have ignored and missed an important part of copyright 
jurisprudence that provides the basis for just and fair allocation of 
legal entitlements in a civil copyright society. 
C. Authors, Readers and Publishers/Distributors 
The importance of the central roles of authors and creative 
authorship in the copyright system may have been neglected as a 
result of early copyright law development within the book-
publishing business.127  The privileges granted to printers to print 
books represented the earliest form of copyright, which begun as a 
publisher’s right to print copies of a work and prevent any 
unauthorized printing of the same work.128  The right was 
essentially an economic right which protected the receipts of 
profits from publication of a work and prevented the piracy of 
books that would undercut profits.129  Generally, the title of a work 
 
 126 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral 
Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).  The 
doctrine on joint authorship doctrine focuses largely on economic rather than personal 
rights but yet, as Professor Kwall argues: 
[J]oint authorship implicates the personal rights of creators on a most 
fundamental level because the doctrine concerns itself with who 
qualifies for authorship status.  Authorship recognition is especially 
critical for the majority of nondominant authors who contribute to 
collaborative works because without recognition they are denied any 
sort of right of attribution by virtue of inadequate federal protection 
for their moral rights.  In practice, the operation of the joint 
authorship doctrine privileges the voices of dominant authors over 
those of nondominant contributors, thereby submerging the voices of 
those who furnish qualitatively important, although quantitatively 
less significant, components of a particular work. 
Id. 
 127 PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 43–44. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id. at 44. 
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and the name of the person who was entitled to publish the book 
would be entered into a register book with the Stationer’s 
Company,130 the guild for bookbinders, printers and publishers.131  
In this early copyright system, there was no explicit mention of the 
rights of an author over the work by virtue of the author’s creative 
authorship of the work, and authors, specifically excluded from 
membership of the Stationer’s Company, had very little influence 
on the development of this early form of copyright as a right to 
print and publish books and manuscripts.132 
However, an author’s rights over uses of the manuscript itself 
appear to be implicitly recognized in the relationship and 
contractual dealings for the sale of the manuscript between authors 
and publishers.133  Lyman Ray Patterson argues that these contracts 
between authors and publishers, which require a promise from 
authors not to interfere with the publication of a work,134 or which 
allowed a retention by the author of his right to make additions, 
corrections and amendments to the work after it was sold,135 
indicate that the publishers had only a very narrow right to publish 
a work and that authors possessed a residual right in works that 
was not automatically transferred to the publisher by sale of the 
manuscript.136  Authors therefore had a creative right in the work 
that publishers recognized as an author’s continued interest in the 
work by virtue of the author’s creativity, which the publisher had 
very little control over.137 
This separation of authors’ rights from the narrow right of 
publishers to publish manuscripts is an important separation 
between natural and economic rights that ought to be 
 
 130 Id. at 51. 
 131 For a detailed discussion on the Stationer’s Company, see id. at 28–41. 
 132 Id. at 64–65. 
 133 Id. at 65–67. 
 134 Id. at 73.  John Milton’s contract for Paradise Lost included a promise that Milton, 
as the author, would not interfere with the publication of the work. Id. at 74. 
 135 Id. at 74–75.  In a contract between the poet James Thomson and the publisher 
Millar, Thomson assigned the “right and property of printing” and “all benefit of all 
additions, corrections, and amendments which should be afterwards made in the same 
copies.” Id. 
 136 Id. at 75. 
 137 Id. at 75–76. 
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acknowledged as creating two distinct sets of rights—property 
entitlements and economic privileges—in copyright jurisprudence.  
The Statute of Anne blurred this distinction by codifying the 
stationer’s copyright138 while emphasizing the authors as being 
vested with the copyright in their works to limit the monopoly that 
publishers had over the book trade.139  This strategy employed by 
Parliament to break up the monopoly of publishers caused any 
natural rights that authors had in their work by virtue of their 
creative authorship to merge with the economic privilege that 
publishers possessed to profit from the publication and 
dissemination of a work.140  This merger of natural entitlements 
 
 138 Id. at 146.  Professor Patterson contends: 
The most significant point about the statutory copyright is that it was 
almost certainly a codification of the stationer’s copyright.  The 
similarity of the two is too great to be coincidental . . . .  [T]he 
stationer’s copyright was probably the only copyright familiar to 
Parliament . . . .  The method of acquiring the statutory copyright was 
similar to that for acquiring the stationer’s copyright—registration of 
the title of a work prior to publication in the register books of the 
Stationer’s Company . . . the protection given by the statute was the 
same protection given by the stationer’s copyright—protection from 
the piracy of printed works. 
Id. 
 139 Id. at 145.  As Professor Patterson states: 
The Statute of Anne is usually thought of as having vested the 
copyright of works in their authors; and, superficially, the language 
of the statute conveys the idea that the act was especially to benefit 
authors.  It did enable authors for the first time to acquire the 
copyright of their works, and to this extent, it was a benefit to them. 
 . . .  Emphasis on the author in the Statute of Anne implying that the 
statutory copyright was an author’s copyright was more a matter of 
form than of substance.  The monopolies at which the statute was 
aimed were too long established to be attacked without some basis 
for change.  The most logical and natural basis for the changes was 
the author.  Although the author had never held copyright, his interest 
was always promoted by the stationers as a means to their end.  Their 
arguments had been, essentially, that without order in the trade 
provided by copyright, publishers would not publish books, and 
therefore would not pay authors for their manuscripts.  The draftsmen 
of the Statute of Anne put these arguments to use, and the author was 
used primarily as a weapon against monopoly. 
Id. at 145–47. 
 140 Augustine Birrell states: 
[The Statute of Anne] gave away the whole case of the British author, 
for amidst all the judicial differences during the last century on 
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with economic privileges prevents a proper legal analysis of 
author’s rights and the notion of creative authorship in a way that 
is independent of the economics of the commercial marketplace.  
As Professor Patterson explains, copyright 
was to become a concept to embrace all the rights to 
be had in connection with published works, either 
by the author or publisher.  As such, it was to 
prevent a recognition of the different interests of the 
two and thus preclude the development of a 
satisfactory law to protect the interests of the author 
as author.141 
Judicial decisions appearing to deny the existence of the 
author’s rights served to further entrench these natural property 
entitlements of an author within the statutory framework for 
copyright.  Publishers started to promote the idea that authors had 
natural rights in their creation that were independent of the Statute 
of Anne to provide the basis for a perpetual copyright to publish 
and sell books as assignees of the author’s right.142  In Millar v. 
Taylor,143 the publishers sought to establish a perpetual common 
law copyright for the author to prolong the publisher’s statutory 
protection, which had expired under the Statute of Anne.144  The 
case was an action brought by one publisher, Andrew Millar, 
against another, Robert Taylor, and did not involve authors, 
although the assertion of the booksellers that they derived their 
rights from the author’s common law rights, the basis for their 
asserting a perpetual right to publish books,145 put authors’ rights 
in their literary and artistic creations at the center of the dispute.  
The Court of King’s Bench ruled that authors had a copyright at 
 
copyright there was a steady majority of judges in favor of the view 
that but for the Statute of Anne an author was entitled to perpetual 
copyright in his published work.  This right (if it ever existed) the Act 
destroyed. 
AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN 
BOOKS 21–22 (Rothman Reprints 1971) (1899). 
 141 PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 151. 
 142 Id. at 158. 
 143 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1796). 
 144 PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 168. 
 145 Id. at 168–69. 
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common law that the Statute of Anne did not take away, 
recognizing that authors had certain natural rights in the works that 
they create.146  The House of Lords’ decision in Donaldson v. 
Beckett147 five years later overruled Millar v. Taylor and decided 
that the author’s common law right to the sole printing, publishing, 
and vending of his works was replaced by the Statute of Anne.148  
The case of Donaldson v. Beckett is generally taken to represent 
the proposition that an author’s right at common law was abolished 
by the Statute of Anne and that the only rights authors had over the 
work was a statutory one.149  Professor Patterson argues that the 
court treated the author’s perpetual common law right as 
supplanted by the Statute of Anne to address the monopoly of 
publishers over the book trade.150  By acknowledging that an 
 
 146 Lord Mansfield based his decision on the justice of recognizing an author’s right: 
It is just that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own 
ingenuity and labour.  It is just, that another should not use his name, 
without his consent.  It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or 
whether he ever will publish.  It is fit he should not only choose the 
time, but the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what 
print.  It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will trust the 
accuracy and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will 
confide, not to foist in additions: with other reasonings of the same 
effect. . . .  But the same reasons hold, after the author has published.  
He can reap no pecuniary profit, if, the next moment after his work 
comes out, it may be pirated upon worse paper and in worse print, 
and in a cheaper volume. 
Millar, 4 Burr. 2303, 2398.  Justice Yates dissented in this decision.  Justice Yates said 
this of the common-law property right in literary works claimed by the booksellers: 
[B]ut the property claimed here is all ideal; a set of ideas which have 
no bounds or marks whatever, nothing that is capable of a visible 
possession, nothing that can sustain any one of the qualities or 
incidents of property.  Their whole existence is in the mind alone; 
incapable of any other modes of acquisition or enjoyment, than by 
mental possession or apprehension; safe and invulnerable, from their 
own immateriality: no trespass can reach them; no tort affect them; 
no fraud or violence damage or affect them.  Yet, these are the 
phantoms which the author would grasp and confine to himself: and 
these are what the defendant is charged with having robbed the 
plaintiff of. 
Millar, 4 Burr. 2303, 2362 (Yates, J., dissenting). 
 147 Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774). 
 148 PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 174. 
 149 Id. at 173. 
 150 Id. at 174–75. 
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author had a right at common law and deciding that the right was 
replaced by a statutory right limited in duration, the court 
effectively prevented publishers from claiming that they were 
assignees of a perpetual common law authorial right that would 
allow their continuous monopoly over the publication of books.151  
Aimed directly at destroying the publishers’ monopoly by 
discarding the author’s common law copyright,152 the decision of 
Donaldson v. Beckett had the effect of merging the author’s natural 
rights in the creation of a work with that of the limited right to 
print provided under the Statute of Anne, leading to a fallacious 
understanding that the author had no other rights over the work 
other than the limited rights provided by the Statute of Anne to 
profit from the publication and sale of the work.153 
 
 151 For a treatment of the legal questions before the House of Lords, see id. at 175–79. 
 152 Lord Camden, in giving his decision, stated that unless the publisher’s monopoly 
was limited “[a]ll our learning will be looked up in the hands of the Tonsons and Lintons 
of the age, who will set what price upon which their avarice chuses to demand, till the 
public becomes as much their slaves, as their own hackney compilers are.” Id. at 178.  
Lord Chief Justice De Grey also noted that the publisher’s use of the author’s common 
law right was a way to prolong their monopoly.  His Lordship stated: 
The truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was not 
taken up until after that failure (of the booksellers) in procuring a new 
statute for the enlargement of the term.  If (say the parties concerned) 
the legislature will not do it for us, we will do it without their 
assistance; and then we begin to hear of this new doctrine, the 
common-law right, which, upon the whole, I am of opinion, cannot 
be supported upon any rules or principles of the common law of this 
kingdom. 
Id. 
 153 Professor Patterson explains: 
If the author no longer had the common-law right to publish, and was 
denied common-law remedies, the conclusion that he had no rights 
except those provided by the statute is almost self evident.  The 
fallacy in this conclusion, of course, is that the court and the Statute 
of Anne did not purport to deal with anything more than the 
copyright in its most limited form.  But the fallacy was obscured by 
the conclusion that except when the author complied with the terms 
of the statute, publication resulted in a gift of the work to the public.  
As long as the relationship was between the author and publisher—
that is, a two dimensional affair—it was fairly easy to say that the 
author retained certain rights upon selling the copy.  The making of a 
gift of the work to the public, however, resulted in the inference of an 
abdication of all rights. 
Id. at 176. 
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Sixty years later, in Wheaton v. Peters,154 the United States 
Supreme Court faced the identical question that was before the 
courts in Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Beckett on whether the 
author possessed a common law right in the work that was 
independent of the statutory rights under the Copyright Act of 
1790.155  The Copyright Act of 1790, the first copyright statute 
passed in accordance with Congress’s constitutional powers, was 
an act for the encouragement of learning156 by granting printing, 
reprinting, publishing or vending rights over maps, charts and 
books to authors and proprietors.157  Like the Statute of Anne, the 
proprietor of a work is treated as being on the same footing as the 
author, and the rights provided for, which were wholly statutory 
and not based on any natural rights that the author had over the 
work, were regarded to be all the rights that the author would have 
in his or her work after its publication.158  Wheaton v. Peters 
affirmed this view when Justice M’Lean, writing for the majority, 
asserted that an author’s literary property can only be claimed by 
statute: 
[A]n author, at common law, has a property in his 
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one 
who deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining 
a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its 
publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very 
different right from that which asserts a perpetual 
 
 154 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). 
 155 See id. at 608. 
 156 Only the title of the Act mentions learning.  The protection of the author and the 
promotion of learning were secondary to the ideas that copyright is a government grant 
and a monopoly. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 198. 
 157 See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (May 31, 1790) (repealed 1909). 
 158 The Act was generally restrictive in nature.  Provisions in the Act provided for 
restrictive limitations, limited the benefits to citizens and residents of the United States, 
required actions to be brought within a one-year limitation and legalized the piracy of 
foreign works. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7,  at 200.  According to Professor 
Patterson: 
[I]t is difficult to come to any conclusion except that the copyright 
provided for was wholly statutory, without any reliance upon natural 
rights of the author.  The conclusion that inevitably follows is that the 
copyright under the federal act did not . . . merely affirm and protect 
rights of the author; it created them. 
Id. 
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and exclusive property in the future publication of 
the work, after the author shall have published it to 
the world.159 
Justice M’Lean goes on to state further that “[t]he argument 
that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labour 
as any other member of society, cannot be controverted.  And the 
answer is, that he realises this product by the transfer of his 
manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.”160 
To Justice M’Lean, Congress, in passing the 1790 Act, “did not 
legislate in reference to existing rights”161 and that “Congress . . . 
instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created 
it.”162 
The decision of Wheaton v. Peters—that copyright was 
statutorily created and had not originated at common law—set the 
trajectory for the development of copyright jurisprudence that is 
today based entirely on positive, as opposed to, natural law.163  
Professor Patterson and Stanley Lindberg argue that the decision 
was too simplistic a solution to a complex problem in which the 
publishers sought monopoly over the publication of books based 
on the fallacy that the ownership of the copyright is the same as the 
ownership of the work.164  Without resolving the question of how 
an author’s interest in the work can be protected without giving 
 
 159 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 661. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 
47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 317, 324–25 (2000).  Professor Hamilton notes that the 
Court in Wheaton v. Peters precluded natural law considerations in copyright law in its 
refusal to consider the application of English copyright law in the United States, basing 
its decision on a theory or philosophy that would trump statutory law (John Locke’s 
theory of property was widely available and discussed at the time of the decision) or give 
the Courts greater judicial power to interpret the Constitution’s copyright clause. Id.  
Professor Hamilton states that “[b]y explicitly and firmly placing copyright law in the 
hands of  Congress, the Court’s reading of the Copyright Clause in Wheaton v. Peters 
distanced federal copyright law from any necessary connection to natural law. . . .  [T]hat 
copyright law is, first and foremost, statutory law.” Id. 
 164 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW 
OF USERS’ RIGHTS 64 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1991) [hereinafter PATTERSON & LINDBERG, 
THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT]. 
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publishers their desired market monopoly,165 the decision in 
Wheaton v. Peters set the tone for future copyright thinking by 
indicating that the natural rights of authors in their creative works 
are the same economic statutory rights that copyright proprietors 
possess to publish and distribute works in the form of a narrow 
“copyright” or right to copy.166 
However, the distinction between the natural rights of the 
individual author and the economic statutory rights of the 
publisher, or copyright proprietor, is an important distinction that 
ought not to be ignored in copyright jurisprudence because both 
authors and publishers serve entirely different purposes within the 
copyright system and are encouraged by entirely different values in 
making literary and artistic works available to the public.  The 
early separation of authors from their publishers and the book-
printing business in England prior to the Statute of Anne167 and the 
wholesale manner in which rights to print and vend a particular 
manuscript was transferred to the publisher168 indicated separate 
 
 165 Patterson and Lindberg contend: 
[T]he Wheaton case suffered from the defect of its virtue, for its 
holding was a simplistic solution to a complex problem: How to 
protect the author’s interest in his or her work without at the same 
time providing the bookseller an unregulated monopoly.  This 
monopoly, of course, is based on the fallacy that ownership of the 
work is ownership of the copyright and vice versa, which can be 
traced to the Millar and Donaldson cases. 
Id. 
 166 Professor Alfred Yen argues: 
Like Donaldson, Wheaton can be read as requiring the elimination of 
copyright’s natural law dimensions in favor of increasing emphasis 
on copyright’s economic theory.  First, Wheaton explicitly disavowed 
the existence of common law copyright, which was based in the 
natural law.  Second, Wheaton’s rejection of common law copyright 
meant that the federal copyright statute became the only source of 
copyright protection for a published work.  Since the federal statute 
arose under constitutional authority to promote the useful arts, it 
seemed natural for courts to adopt this purpose as copyright’s guiding 
principle. 
Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 517, 530 (1990). 
 167 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 164, at 112. 
 168 See id. at 113–14. 
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and distinct interests in a work that persists even today.169  The 
author-publisher relationship, one that exists between the creator of 
a literary and artistic work and the entrepreneur, is a necessary 
relationship to bring a completed work to the public.170  While an 
author invests creative resources, individual expression and 
personal authorship in creating and producing a work, it is the 
publisher who invests financially to print or publish a work and 
distributes it to the public.171 
Professor Patterson’s historical documentation on the legal 
development of copyright as a narrow right of the publishers to 
print, publish and profit from the work, pertaining only to an 
economic interest in the work provided for by statute, provides an 
important perspective on the nature of an author’s right.172  
Originating in individual creativity and authorship and separate 
from a narrow right to print and publish that may be assigned to a 
publisher, the author’s natural rights to the work are outside the 
ambit of the statutory copyright,173 rights which ought to be 
understood as an affirmation of the author’s economic interest but 
 
 169 See William Cornish, The Authors as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 
(2002) (“[T]he entrepreneurs have secured copyright in the name of the author but use 
their contractual deals to reap most of the advantages from the exclusive right.  So it was 
in the beginning, with the clique of London booksellers who secured the Statute of Anne 
in 1710, and so no doubt it ever shall be.”). 
 170 Maureen A. O’Rourke, A Brief History of Author-Publisher Relations and the 
Outlook for the 21st Century, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 425, 426 (2003) (“[T]he 
relationship between authors and their publishers . . . largely determines who creates what 
types of copyrighted works and whether those works’ distribution promotes the public 
welfare.”). 
 171 Professor Cornish calls the author the “literary or artistic creator” and refers to the 
publisher or producer as the “entrepreneur who contracts to bring the work to the public 
in one or other form.” Cornish, supra note 169, at 2. 
 172 See PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT, supra note 7, at 77. 
 173 Professor Patterson argues: 
The evidence available to us clearly indicates that the stationers 
recognized the author’s property rights.  They recognized also other 
rights of the author, rights which can be called creative rights, 
although the term undoubtedly did not occur to them.  That such 
rights may not have been fully developed need hardly concern us, for 
their existence at all shows that the stationers were aware of the 
continuing interest of the author in his works by reason of the fact 
that he created them.  And it is this point which confirms the other 
evidence as to the limited scope of the stationer’s copyright. 
Id. 
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not the entire set of rights in a work.  In light of the historical 
development of copyright, the much wider natural rights that 
authors have, besides the limited economic rights provided to them 
and proprietors of their work under copyright statutes, provide the 
basis for which property entitlements may be recognized.  Without 
undermining society’s right to access creative works, the rights of 
authors may be separated from the rights of publishers/distributors.  
The rights authors have as property entitlements arise from their 
individual creativity and authorship; economic privileges 
statutorily created to ensure publication and dissemination of 
creative works to the public, on the other hand, are granted to 
publishers and distributors of creative works to provide investment 
incentives to publishing and distributing the work to society as a 
matter of public policy.  These rights work to encourage the 
creation, publication and distribution of creative works to the 
public.  By recognizing three parties to the copyright system—
authors, readers and publishers/distributors—the copyright system 
may allocate entitlements in literary and artistic works among them 
in a manner that is fair and just in accordance with a social 
agreement to a civil copyright society.  A fair and just allocation of 
entitlements will not be possible unless: the author is recognized as 
being a separate individual possessing property entitlements in his 
or her creations within the copyright system; readers are 
acknowledged as being entitled to literary and artistic works that 
contribute to knowledge and the pursuit of excellence and access to 
a pool of creative resources for learning and education; and 
publishers/distributors are entitled to recover their financial 
investments in publishing and distributing works to the public.  It 
is only when these different rights are properly recognized through 
the copyright system that authentic authorship can occur in a 
manner that ultimately benefits society. 
II. NATURAL LAW, NATURAL RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT 
Understanding authors’ rights as being the same as the 
economic rights of publishers, granted by way of statutory 
provisions, may be the primary reason for a failure to see authors 
as individuals possessing rights because of their creative 
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authorship, rights not granted by way of statute in accordance with 
constitutional goals and congressional policies to “promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts”174 in society.  As a result 
of this understanding, copyright and literary scholars argue that the 
notion of authorship has become a cultural, political, economic and 
social construction that persisted in copyright jurisprudence 
because of the way judges and scholars came to view creative 
authorship as an “uncritically accepted notion” that is “grounded 
on an uncritical belief in the existence of a distinct and privileged 
category of activity, that generates products of special social value, 
entitling the practitioners (the ‘authors’) to unique reward.”175 
The aim of this Article is to suggest otherwise—that a critical 
examination of the historical trajectory of copyright law and the 
notion of the romantic author and creative authorship reveals a 
separate and distinct role that authors have in the copyright system, 
a role which necessitates the recognition of their individual rights 
as existing independently against the utilitarian goals and aims of 
the copyright system.  Property rights in literary and artistic works 
ought to only be owned by authors by virtue of their creative 
authorship, with rights over the use of these works allocated within 
the copyright system in accordance with contractarian notions of 
justice and fairness.  As “the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts”176 is dependent on the works that authors produce and create 
for society, authors are therefore under a moral or ethical 
obligation to society to produce and create for the common good of 
society.  The allocation of rights over literary and artistic works 
must therefore be premised on theories of natural law and natural 
rights that recognize both property rights that authors have over the 
works by virtue of their creative authorship and the rights society 
possesses to use those works for development and growth.177  Part 
 
 174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 175 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 455, 459–66 (1991). 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 177 Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) [hereinafter 
Gordon, A Property Right].  Professor Gordon argues that a natural rights theory can 
protect both the interests of authors and the public: 
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II of this Article builds on the discussion of Part I, which 
establishes the centrality of authors and creative authorship in the 
copyright system, by setting the foundations for authorial property 
rights in natural rights theory, and proceeds to discuss how moral 
rights support these natural rights of authors and the process of 
creative authorship within a copyright system.  Part II of this 
Article also considers the natural rights of society to the pursuit of 
knowledge and excellence that is made possible through literary 
and artistic works as well as society’s right to access these works 
for progress and development, and the manner in which these 
public interests ought to be balanced against the rights of authors. 
A. Property Rights in Literary and Artistic Works 
The most commonly cited natural law theory supporting 
property rights in intellectual property is John Locke’s perspective 
that one who mixes individual labor with what nature has provided 
acquires property in what is produced.178  Locke’s reasoning that 
men may, by natural reason, make use of all things that are 
common to all men to improve the conditions of life through the 
“Labour of his body” and “Work of his hands” and obtain property 
in that which he has mixed his labor with179 provides a unique 
theory of property that supports the grant of strong intellectual 
property rights to creators and authors as those who use creative 
materials common to all creators and authors to produce something 
new.180  Conceiving property rights in literary and artistic works 
 
Natural rights theory . . . is necessarily concerned with the rights of 
the public as well as with the rights of those whose labors create 
intellectual products.  When the limitations in natural law’s premises 
are taken seriously, natural rights not only cease to be a weapon 
against free expression; they also become a source of affirmative 
protection for free speech interests. 
Id. 
 178 Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair 
Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1179–81 (2003). 
 179 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).  
 180 Gordon, A Property Right, supra note 177, at 1540 (“Locke’s labor theory of 
property and allied approaches have been used so frequently as a justification for 
creators’ ownership rights that Locke’s Two Treatises have been erroneously credited 
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via Locke’s natural law philosophy offers a compelling alternative 
to copyright analysis that focuses on an individual author’s 
creative efforts, and values authorship as an activity that is, in 
deontological terminology, a good in itself.181  A natural law 
analysis of the copyright system that is independent of the 
economics of the commercial market removes from copyright 
jurisprudence the difficulties associated with setting the balance 
between private rights and social goals that is necessary in a 
copyright system founded on utilitarian principles.182 
Reliance on Locke’s theory of property raises two fundamental 
points about the centrality of authors and the notion of creative 
authorship to the copyright system as an institution to encourage 
authorship.  First, Locke’s idea that authors may acquire property 
rights in things common to nature with which they merge 
individual labor supports a notion of authorship that reflects the 
reality of authorial creativity as a socially interdependent activity 
that draws inspiration from ideas and works that surround an 
author.183  An author may use the works of and be inspired by the 
creative expressions of other authors and creators and still satisfy 
the requirements of originality and creativity in his own work of 
 
with having developed an explicit defense of intellectual property.” (footnotes omitted)).
 181 See Yen, supra note 166, at 517. 
 182 Id. at 539.  Professor Yen notes the inherent difficulties of economic analysis of the 
copyright system: 
The normative use of economics in copyright suffers from, among 
other things, the problems inherent in defining and measuring 
society’s welfare.  To be sure, certain components may be known in a 
general fashion, but constructing a scale which successfully measures 
the existence and value of each of these components is impossible.  
Indeed, the very construction of such a scale would certainly involve 
the identification and evaluation of rights implicit in natural law 
reasoning.  This realization alone weakens the basis for grounding 
copyright theory in economics alone. 
Id. 
 183 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 300 
(1988) (“A society that believes ideas come to people as manna from heaven must look 
somewhere other than Locke to justify the establishment of intellectual property.  The 
labor theory of property does not work if one subscribes to a pure ‘eureka’ theory of 
ideas.”). 
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authorship to acquire property rights in the work created.184  As 
authors depend on works of other authors to produce their own 
original and creative works of authorship, they bear a moral and 
ethical obligation to other authors to ensure the same freedom and 
rights to access their own works to encourage creative authorship 
in other authors and creators.  Second, Locke’s theory of property 
incorporates moral and ethical limitations into the natural rights of 
man to acquire property rights over that in nature which he has 
improved upon, and authorial property rights over literary and 
artistic works, by virtue of these limitations, are therefore not 
absolute but rather subjected to natural law restraints.  These moral 
and ethical limitations in Locke’s theory are twofold.  The first 
limitation is that man’s acquisition of property by labor must leave 
“enough, and as good left,” in the common for others to use, for 
Locke reasons that someone who “leaves as much as another can 
make use of, does as good as take[s] nothing at all.”185  This 
limitation provides a natural limitation to the acquisition of rights 
that is determined by whether enough is left in the common for 
others to use and improve upon.  If society’s ability to use things in 
the common is significantly reduced by the grant of property 
rights, natural law will prohibit the recognition of the right,186 and 
when applied to authorial rights, this proviso in Locke’s theory 
introduces a moral and ethical limitation that sets the extent to 
which property rights over literary and artistic works may reach.  
The second natural law limitation in Locke’s theory on the exercise 
of property rights is the waste prohibition that forbids waste of 
 
 184 Yen, supra note 166, at 554 (“[A]uthors do not truly labor alone.  Although it is 
certainly true that authors are extremely gifted and industrious, the popular vision of 
authors as people who create new things from nothing is simply false.  No author has 
lived an entire life on a proverbial desert island.  Instead, authors live and work as 
members of an artistic community and a broader society whose creations, values and 
experiences form an integral part of the author’s creative vision.  Authorship is therefore 
not the creation of works which spring like Athena from the head of Zeus, but the 
conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and transformation of input gained from the 
author’s experience within a broader society.”). 
 185 LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 33. 
 186 Gordon, A Property Right, supra note 177, at 1563–64 (“[C]reators should have 
property in their original works, only provided that such grant of property does no harm 
to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting cultural matrix 
and scientific heritage.  All persons are equal and have an equal right to the common.”). 
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things in the common.  While Locke believed that God gave the 
world to all men in common for their benefit and to support life,187 
he also believed that men have a moral responsibility to society to 
use things in the common in a way that would enrich their lives 
and not cause prejudice to others,188 for to waste things in the 
common would deprive others of their equal share to things in the 
common.189  As the wasted property may be the “Possession of any 
other,”190 authors have a moral and ethical obligation to use works 
of their creation in a way that would generate benefit or value, or 
stand to lose property rights in their work.191  An author who 
creates a work and attaches no value to it loses property rights in 
the work by virtue of Locke’s waste prohibition.192  In the 
copyright system, this limitation on property rights is particularly 
important in the law’s approach to the treatment of orphan 
works—literary and artistic works whose owners cannot be 
identified or located after a reasonable search—as society will be 
entitled to use these works without fear of infringing the property 
rights of the copyright owner.193 
 
 187 See LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 32. 
 188 See id. §§ 33–34. 
 189 Id. §§ 37–38.  Locke states that if products of nature perished in the possession of 
one man without use, it would be an offense against “the common law of Nature” and he 
would be “liable to be punished”: 
[For] he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no Right farther 
than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford 
him Conveniences of Life. . . .  [I]f either the Grass of his Inclosure 
rotted on the Ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without 
gathering and laying up, this part of the Earth, not withstanding his 
Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the 
Possession of any other. 
Id.  
 190 Id. 
 191 Damstedt, supra note 178, at 1195 (“[A]n individual who polices the waste 
prohibition can be said to have done as good as take nothing at all from the owner.”). 
 192 Id. at 1195–96. 
 193 For treatment of orphan works in the copyright system, see, for example, Mark. H. 
Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright Growing Pains, 7 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2007) (considering the issues pertaining to orphan works and 
offering an analysis and critique of the pending Orphan Works Act 2006); Mark Lemley, 
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 202 
(2007) (applying a compensatory remedy approach to orphan works); Joshua O. 
Mausner, Copyright Orphan Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful 
Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395 (2007) (proposing solutions to the 
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A deontological theory of copyright law will also include, 
besides the labor theory of property, a personality-based 
philosophy that justifies an author’s entitlement to property rights 
in his or her creation because the work manifests the author’s 
personality or self.194  Steeped in continental thinking on the 
author’s moral rights over literary and artistic creations, the 
personality philosophy is best known through the work of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who believed that a person’s personality 
was “that which struggles to lift itself above this restriction [of 
being only subjective] and to give itself reality, or in other words 
to claim that external world as its own.”195  In light of this 
philosophy of property as a person’s entitlement to control 
resources in his or her external environment, an entitlement closely 
linked to his or her personality, Margaret Radin argues that a 
hierarchy of entitlements and a spectrum of rights of different 
strengths will emerge depending on how closely connected an 
entitlement is to a person’s personality.196  If literary and artistic 
works are, as John Milton says, the “precious life blood” of an 
author that is “embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life 
 
orphan works problem); David Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the 
Orphan Works Act of 2006: Would the Act Reduce Transaction Costs, Allocate Orphan 
Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2007) 
(highlighting how the goals of the copyright system are undermined by the presence of 
orphan works and describing the economic and cultural costs associated with these 
works); Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789 
(favoring legislation reform to address orphan works). 
 194 Hughes, supra note 183, at 330. 
 195 Id. (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 39 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1821)). 
 196 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986 (1982).  
Professor Radin envisions rights form a continuum from fungible to personal depending 
on the relationship of a particular right to personhood: 
A general justification of property entitlements in terms of their 
relationship to personhood could hold that the rights that come within 
the general justification form a continuum from fungible to personal.  
It then might hold that those rights near one end of the continuum—
fungible property rights—can be overridden in some cases in which 
those near the other—personal property rights—cannot be.  This is to 
argue not that fungible property rights are unrelated to personhood, 
but simply that distinctions are sometimes warranted depending upon 
the character or strength of the connection.  Thus, the personhood 
perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely 
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement. 
Id. 
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beyond life,”197 it necessarily follows that authors ought to have 
strong property rights in their creations if they represent an 
author’s most intimate being.  Creators of literary and artistic 
works, because of this close relationship between person and work, 
ought not be separated.  This inseparability of person and work 
forms the basis for moral rights protection in works.198  Moral 
rights, in a copyright system based on moral and ethical 
philosophy, are necessary to support creative authorship and 
encourage authors to create literary and artistic works by assuring 
authors that the integrity of their works and personality will be 
protected by the law.199 
B. Moral Rights 
The present function of the copyright system, aimed to protect 
the economic interests of copyright owners by facilitating market 
transactions for creative works, serves to discourage authors from 
creative authorship where the law fails to adequately acknowledge 
an author’s non-economic interests or moral rights in a work.  The 
attribution society makes to an author for a work created, or the 
respect society shows an author by not mutilating or using the 
work in derogatory ways, may mean more to an author than the 
financial rewards that commercialization of the work may reap.200  
Encouraging creative authorship in society through the copyright 
system necessitates the acknowledgement of moral rights of 
authors in their creation for two reasons.  The first reason to 
acknowledge the moral rights of authors is that authors, more often 
than not, write and create for personal non-economic gains, and an 
 
 197 Milton, supra note 57, at 342. 
 198 See Linda Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyright, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1542 
(1989) (“The personhood theory of intellectual property thus supports not only the idea of 
copyright in artistic products, but also the idea of moral rights.”). 
 199 See id. at 1548–49. 
 200 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and The Moral Right: Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985) (“Because copyright law protects 
works that are the product of the creator’s mind, heart, and soul, a degree of protection in 
addition to that which guarantees financial returns is warranted.  The 1976 Act does not 
purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright owner.  Nevertheless, a creator, 
regardless of whether he holds the copyright in his work, has a personal interest in 
preserving the artistic integrity of his work and compelling recognition for his 
authorship.”). 
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acknowledgement of moral rights recognizes an author’s 
individual expression of personality in the creative process of 
authorship that is separate from the economic right in a work.201  
By protecting an author’s personal expression in a work and 
regarding literary and artistic works as an inalienable extension of 
an author’s personality that entitles an author to restrict uses of the 
work by blocking publication of the work—determining the 
manner in which authorship is attributed and preventing material 
changes and uses of the work in ways that contradict the author’s 
artistic vision, even after the exclusive right to market the work has 
been granted to another202—moral rights jurisdictions in the 
continental tradition assure authors of the protection of their 
personal dignity and individual personality that is expressed in 
their creations.203  By protecting the moral rights of authors, 
copyright law ensures that an author’s personal integrity remains 
intact after the creation is made available to the public and this, as 
a result, encourages the kind of authentic authorship that 
contributes to the pursuit of excellence within society. 
The second reason that necessitates the protection of the moral 
rights of authors affirms a natural right of individuals within 
society to pursue knowledge and excellence as a human good.  By 
recognizing moral rights of authors, society is ensured of works of 
authentic authorship that are of significant value to authors and 
 
 201 Edward Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the Protection 
of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1988).  In explaining the 
theoretical basis for the French droit moral, Professor Damich cites Joseph Kohler’s 
dualist theory of author’s rights that a work is the expression of the author’s personality 
with a property aspect to it that signifies the work’s economic value: 
According to Kohler the author creates a work of art and thus projects 
his personality into it.  The work also has an economic value which 
can be commercially exploited and is treated like property.  The 
work, however, still remains the projection of the author’s 
personality, which, as the primary value, must take precedence over 
the economic aspect. 
Id. 
 202 Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in 
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 
(1994). 
 203 Kwall, supra note 126, at 23 (“The various components of the moral rights doctrine 
reflect the unmistakable reality that this doctrine is concerned with protecting the author’s 
personal dignity and the human spirit reflected in her artistic creations.”). 
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their readers, as authors who are assured of the protection of their 
personal artistic integrity are more likely to invest their individual 
personality and creativity in producing literary and artistic works 
that resonate with the human soul.  The inspiration, solace and 
wisdom that readers of all generations find in great works of 
authentic authorship stem from the creativity of authors and writers 
who had the courage to pursue the inner promptings of their 
individual personality and as a result, make a marked contribution 
to society.  There is a natural inclination for the human mind to 
always return to its need for “beauty, truth and insight,” as Harold 
Bloom reminds us,204 and the acknowledgement of an author’s 
moral rights in works assures society of creations that embody the 
beauty, truth and insight that represents the author’s authentic self. 
C. Rights to Pursue Knowledge and Excellence 
Natural rights of individuals within society, predicated on a 
theory of natural law, exist to equip every human person with the 
right to make decisions to fulfill their highest potential.205  Natural 
law philosophers adhere to the belief that there are basic human 
goods that are common to all men,206 which if pursued within a 
legal system, allow men to achieve their highest moral potential207 
and maintain a cohesive social order within society.208  By 
 
 204 HAROLD BLOOM, WHERE SHALL WISDOM BE FOUND? 1 (Riverhead Books 2004). 
 205 JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY & PRACTICE 77 (St. 
Augustine Press 2001) (“Every human person has the right to make its own decisions 
with regard to its personal destiny, whether it be a question of choosing one’s work, of 
marrying the man or woman of one’s choice or of pursuing a religious vocation.”). 
 206 Id. at 77–78.  These rights include fundamental human rights such as “the right to 
existence and life; the right to personal freedom,” the right “to conduct one’s own life as 
master of oneself and of one’s acts,” the right to pursue “a moral and rational human 
life,” the right to pursue the eternal good, “the right to keep one’s body whole,” the right 
to property, the right to marry and raise a family and the right to free association. Id. 
 207 ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (explaining 
that traditional natural law thinking on morality, politics and law maintains that law has a 
legitimate role to help people make themselves moral by preventing self corruption of 
men who act upon a choice to indulge in immoral activities, preventing the emulation of 
this behavior by others, preserving the “moral ecology in which people make their 
morally self-constituting choices” and educating people about what is morally wrong and 
right). 
 208 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 217 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980) 
(“[P]ublic order . . . concerns the maintenance . . . of the physical environment and 
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encouraging authentic authorship through copyright laws, a greater 
amount of creative works manifesting the genuine expressions of 
an author’s artistic personality will be produced, presenting 
individuals in society with a plethora of literary and artistic choices 
as to what to read and pursue.  These choices individuals within 
society have as a result of a copyright system that encourages 
authentic authorship protect and validate the natural right of 
individuals to pursue knowledge and excellence as basic human 
goods that are inherently good in themselves.  Whether individuals 
within society make this choice to pursue knowledge and 
excellence209 is a question that the law may not be equipped to deal 
with, for the imposition of moral choices upon individuals in 
society may cause deleterious results.210  However, by presenting 
these choices, the law adopts a moral standpoint that affirms the 
natural right of individuals within society to pursue knowledge and 
excellence as a chosen activity.211 
Incorporating natural rights of individuals to the pursuit of 
knowledge and excellence into the copyright system introduces a 
moral and ethical dimension to the law that sets certain boundaries 
around how an author’s property and moral rights in literary and 
artistic works may arise.  An author’s use of materials in the 
 
structure of expectations and reliances essential to the well being of all members of a 
community, especially the weak.  Inciting hatred amongst sections of the community is 
not merely an injury to the rights of those hated; it threatens everyone in the community 
with a future of violence and of other violations of right, and this threat is itself an injury 
to the common good and is reasonably referred to as a violation of public order.”). 
 209 Id. at 65.  Professor Finnis argues that not everyone recognizes the value of 
knowledge, or that there are no “pre-conditions” for the recognition of that value.  He 
explains that “[t]he principle that truth (and knowledge) is worth pursuing is not 
somehow innate, inscribed in the mind at birth.” Id. 
 210 The question of whether copyright law may impose upon individuals the duty to 
pursue a morally worthy activity and whether people have a “right to do wrong” is a 
controversial question that natural law theorists grapple with.  For the ongoing debate on 
this issue, see generally GEORGE, supra note 207, at 110–28. 
 211 By encouraging works of authentic authorship, the law presents individuals with a 
choice to pursue an activity that contributes towards the development of their best 
individual moral potential.  As Harold Bloom reminds us, “[i]t matters, if individuals are 
to retain any capacity to form their own judgments and opinions, that they continue to 
read for themselves.  How they read, well or badly, and what they read cannot depend 
wholly upon themselves, but why they read must be for their own interest.” HAROLD 
BLOOM, HOW TO READ AND WHY 21 (Simon & Schuster 2000). 
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common to create literary and artistic works ought to be such that 
it corresponds with society’s right to pursue knowledge and 
excellence through his or her work.  Besides the “enough, and as 
good left” and “prohibition against waste” conditions setting 
limitations to an author’s rights in Locke’s theory of property,212 
recognizing society’s right to the pursuit of knowledge and 
excellence through an author’s work also creates a corresponding 
moral and ethical obligation upon authors to produce works that 
would contribute to that purpose.  These natural rights of 
individuals in society ought to also create a moral and ethical 
obligation on authors to create works that are an authentic 
expression and reflection of their personality and artistic soul for 
moral rights to be acknowledged and protected. 
D. Rights to Access Literary and Artistic Works 
Copyright scholarship on society’s rights to access literary and 
artistic works for the creation of new works, education, research, 
cultural growth and development, and artistic and literary 
inspiration is both rich and abundant.213  The present copyright 
system, requiring the maximization of the aggregate amount of 
collective social welfare as a normative utilitarian aim,214 seeks to 
assure society of access to literary and artistic works through the 
efficient allocation of entitlements in the commercial market.215  
However, the incommensurability of values attached to creative 
authorship,216 difficulties with calibrating the right amount of 
entitlements between authors, readers and 
publishers/distributors,217 and the market failures that usually 
 
 212 LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, §§ 33, 38. 
 213 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURES AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 
(Penguin Press 2004) [Hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 
2001) [Hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS]; Kreiss, supra note 29; Lemley, 
Property, supra note 29; Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 65; Netanel, Copyright, 
supra note 20. 
 214 Ghosh, supra note 109, at 870. 
 215 Trosow, supra note 40, at 227. 
 216 See Sunstein, supra note 124, at 799. 
 217 See Nachbar, supra note 27, at 278. 
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accompany intangible goods such as creative works218 make it 
difficult to facilitate fair consensual exchanges of entitlements 
between copyright owners and the public in the market.219 
The ethical and moral dimension to copyright law cannot be 
ignored if we are serious about creating literary and artistic works 
for social progress and cultural development.220  The notion of 
romantic authorship focuses on the process of creativity, the 
process of using works from the commons to reach new 
grounds,221 as that which is deserving of an entitlement.  The focus 
 
 218 See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 32, at 1613. 
 219 David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).  
The chance of possessing market power, for example, could impede fair exchanges of 
entitlements.  As Professor McGowan explains: 
For works the public demands, and for which there are imperfect 
substitutes, copyright offers authors a chance at some degree of 
market power.  There may be very few such works, so the discounted 
value of that power might be very modest.  It is still possible, though, 
that the lure of market power causes authors to invest too many 
resources in prospecting for copyright riches. 
Id. 
 220 ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 54 (Duke 
Univ. Press 1998) (“Scholars have shown how our intellectual property laws—copyright 
in particular—have developed without due regard for the public interest, ignoring our 
social interests in freedom of speech, promoting expressive activity, or protecting the 
public domain.”). 
 221 Ghosh, supra note 109, at 861.  Professor Ghosh tells the fable of the intellectual 
property commons to describe the use of creative materials that, unlike the commons that 
Garrett Hardin envisioned, is not prone to depletion and overuse.  Professor Ghosh’s 
fable is as follows: 
Imagine a denizen of the commons.  One day she looks out beyond 
the pastures shared with her fellow residents to the ocean that 
surrounds the communal island.  She sees what at first looks like an 
optical illusion, the play of clouds and water, but what slowly reveals 
the jagged peaks of a mountain range.  Beyond the boundaries of her 
commons, past the ocean waves, lies land, and on that land appears to 
be another world, another set of possibilities.  Driven by whatever 
need or interest, imperfectly defined and understood, she decides to 
pursue this destination, planning the travel arrangements, thinking 
through the journey.  After she takes off for the new world, our 
voyager notices that several fellow denizens are pursuing the same 
dream.  As the race continues, each traveler wants to arrive first, 
unsure of what is in store for her on the new commons.  When they 
reach the new commons, many of the vexing problems from the old 
world come back to haunt them, and the voyagers seek new solutions 
and social arrangements to address familiar tensions. 
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on this process and the grant of entitlements as a natural right 
reveres the creative process of authorship that involves taking 
materials from the common and incorporating pieces of works 
from nature and the public domain to form a new work.  Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom expressed in copyright and literary 
scholarship that the romantic author is an autonomous being who 
creates alone, authors in reality create as an individual member of 
society.222  Rights of access to literary and artistic works are a 
reflection and affirmation of the rights of all authors in society to 
create and be engaged in the process of authentic authorship.  The 
recognition of society’s rights to access literary and artistic works 
for inspiration and the production of other forms of creative works 
function to provide restraints on the rights of authors, because 
authors, who produce works through the use of other forms of 
existing works in the common, owe a moral and ethical obligation 
to make their works available to other members of society in order 
to serve the same purposes of encouraging authentic authorship in 
other authors.  The natural rights of society to access literary and 
artistic works provide natural law restrictions on how property and 
moral rights of authors may be exercised within a civil society.  
Having identified the role of authors as being central in the 
copyright system as well as the natural rights that they possess vis-
à-vis the natural rights that other individuals within society possess 
in relation to literary and artistic creations, the next part of this 
Article, Part III, proceeds to discuss how these rights are arranged 
within a society according to the social contract in order to achieve 
fair and just distribution of entitlements. 
 
Id.  The intellectual commons as Professor Ghosh’s fable indicates is “about looking 
outward, about exploring new horizons, and ultimately about expanding the existing 
commons.” Id. 
 222 Yen, supra note 166, at 554. (“No author has lived an entire life on a proverbial 
desert island.  Instead, authors live and work as members of an artistic community and a 
broader society whose creations, values and experiences form an integral part of the 
author’s creative vision.  Authorship is therefore not the creation of works which spring 
like Athena from the head of Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion 
and transformation of input gained from the author’s experience within a broader society.  
Works of authorship therefore capture more than the author’s personality alone.  They 
capture a combination of the author’s personality, the society in which she lives, and the 
works of other authors.”). 
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III. COPYRIGHT CONTRACTARIANISM 
Theories on the social contract stretch across a wide range of 
individual beliefs about what a civil society and government 
should look like.  Contemporary political philosophy on the social 
contract, perhaps most popularly identified in the writings of John 
Rawls,223 suggests that a civil society predicated on notions of 
justice and fairness can only exist if individuals within that society 
agree upon certain standards and manners of behavior.  In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls explains that the guiding idea in his 
conception of the social contract is that the “principles of justice 
for the basic structure of society are the object of the original 
agreement.  They are the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial 
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their 
association.”224  Earlier natural law writings by Thomas Hobbes,225 
John Locke226 and John-Jacques Rousseau227 during the Age of 
 
 223 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) [hereinafter 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Hobbes saw men as possessing certain natural rights and liberties that could be 
transferred or renounced in consideration of a reciprocal right that is transferred to them 
or for some other good they hoped to receive for their own benefit.  Governments form 
by way of institution when men agree collectively with each other to submit themselves 
to an assembly of men or a government to represent and protect them, and they 
collectively consent to conferring sovereign power to this institution. THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 228–29 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651). 
 226 John Locke perceived men as being “free, equal and independent” in a state of 
nature and only subject to political power by consent, which is done “by agreeing with 
other Men, to joyn and unite into a Community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable 
living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater 
Security against any that are not of it.” LOCKE, supra note 179, bk. II, § 95.  Locke goes 
on to state that “[w]hen any number of men have so consented to make one Community or 
Government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, 
wherein the Majority have a Right to act and conclude the rest.” Id.  
 227 Rousseau believed that man’s transition from the state of nature to a civil state 
“produces a very remarkable change in [him]”: 
[B]y [its] substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving 
his actions the morality they had formerly lacked.  Then only, when 
the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of 
appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that 
he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason 
before listening to his inclinations. 
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Enlightenment, when ideas of the rational individual acting on his 
or her own best interests were assertively advanced as the basis for 
which societies were formed, put forward a theoretical framework 
that predicated democracy on a coherent political system where 
individuals surrender their rights and liberties to a sovereign to rule 
over them. 
The social contract theories offer a fundamental theory about 
individual, societal and governmental or state relations that 
provides an important tool to deepen our understanding of the 
copyright system and what the law aims to achieve through the 
grant of statutory rights that create a temporary monopoly over 
literary and artistic works for which society bears the cost.228  This 
 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 195 (Everyman 
1993) (1762).  Rousseau then adds: 
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an 
unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; 
what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he 
possesses.  If we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the 
other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded 
only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is 
limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect 
of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be 
founded only on a positive title. 
Id. at 195–96. 
 228 The monopoly arises through the recognition of property rights over literary and 
artistic works under the Copyright Act. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  Whether 
the statutory grant and exclusive rights over creative works is really necessary for the 
book printing business is debatable as a demonstration that initial publication costs are 
high compared to the significantly lower reproduction costs of copyrighted works are 
insufficient reasons to provide copyright protection.  Other factors such as lead time 
advantage, the threat of retaliation by the publisher and the existence of other ways of 
sustaining a publisher’s revenue provide other incentives that may cast doubts on the 
extent copyright is needed to provide an incentive for publication. See Stephen Breyer, 
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299–304 (1970).  The social utility of 
copyright is often a highly debatable matter and a quick response to Professor Breyer’s 
article demonstrates the divided views on this issue. See generally Barry W. Tyerman, 
The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to 
Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971) (arguing that copyright provides an 
efficient system to ensure authors have the financial and intellectual incentives to write 
and that publishers are able to produce a wide variety of books for the public).  Professor 
Breyer replies and clarifies that his earlier article sets an analytical framework for 
assessing the desirability for copyright protection for different forms of copyrighted 
materials. See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75, 75 (1973).  
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Article argues that copyright law ought to be about the 
encouragement of authentic authorship by encouraging authors to 
be creative in their production of literary and artistic works for the 
public to benefit from.  The law is much less about the publication, 
dissemination or commercialization of creative works and more 
about setting the optimum conditions in which authors and creators 
are encouraged to produce these works that will appeal to and 
benefit the public.  The fundamental tenet of the social contract 
theory—that individuals within society arrive at a mutually 
beneficial agreement to be governed by a state authority, moral 
norms or a theory of justice as fairness229—is a particularly 
important philosophical idea to help us understand the historical 
trajectory of copyright law that has led us to this point and to 
provide us with a road map as to where we should head for the 
future with copyright policies and law. 
When applied to copyright jurisprudence, the social contract 
theory helps us see clearly that the system that developed to 
control the reproduction and dissemination of books as the printing 
press emerged has produced a state in society in which 
entitlements over literary and artistic works are seldom fairly or 
justly settled and allocated.  The constitutional clause promoting 
the “Progress of Science and useful Arts”230 is a perceived 
limitation on Congress’s intellectual property law-making power 
that ought to subject intellectual property laws to the condition that 
they “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,”231 
thereby signifying that private entitlements over literary and 
artistic works are indeed subject to some form of public consensus 
 
Perhaps the most famous objection to overly extensive copyright protection in duration 
was expressed by Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay in his speech before the House of 
Commons by referring to copyright as a “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a 
bounty to writers.” Macaulay, supra note 21. 
 229 See generally RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 223. 
 230 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 231 Id.; see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771, 
1810 (2006).  Professor Oliar studied the intellectual property records from the Federal 
Convention of 1787 and argues that the constitutional clause was intended by the Framers 
to be a limitation on the kind of intellectual property laws that Congress could enact. Id.  
If so, then intellectual property laws must be subjected to the condition that knowledge is 
advanced and society improved.  Id. 
VOL19_BOOK2_NG 2/26/2009  3:27:18 AM 
2009] ALLOCATING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 473 
that society should progress232 when intellectual property owners 
are given rights over goods that are inherently public.233 
A. Collective Agreement in Society 
The underlying rationale for the grant of exclusive rights over 
artistic works is to provide an author with the means of recovering 
payment for the work by setting up a mechanism by which an 
author’s readers may reward an author’s creative endeavors 
through the free market.234  For this reason, an author is ultimately 
beholden to the commercial marketplace as his or her patron, for it 
is the author’s readers who will reward creative authorship through 
the payment of royalties.235  The commercial market for literary 
and artistic works is therefore an important institution to ensure 
that authors and creators are connected to the public, the ultimate 
 
 232 “Progress” would involve an advancement or improvement in society.  It would also 
include the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the advancement of 
human happiness, service and learning, the “general good of mankind,” and “the 
cultivation and improvement of the human mind.” Id. at 1808. 
 233 Economists generally view information products as “public goods” that display two 
characteristics. See Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Public Goods Economics: A 
Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2007).  First, public goods are 
non-rivalrous, i.e., the consumption of the good by one person does not prevent the 
consumption of the good by another. Id.  Second, public goods are non-excludable, i.e., 
that it would be difficult for the owner of a public good to exclude some members of the 
public from enjoying the goods. Id.  However, because technology allows some works to 
be excludable through technological protection measures, copyrighted materials are said 
to be club goods; that is a form of public goods, that while non-rivalrous, are to some 
extent excludable. See id. at 678–79. 
 234 Professor Paul Goldstein believes that authorship entails a direct communication 
between authors and their intended audiences.  Professor Goldstein states, “[c]opyright 
sustains the very heart and essence of authorship by enabling this communication, this 
connection.  It is copyright that makes it possible for audiences—markets—to form for an 
author’s work, and it is copyright that makes it possible for publishers to bring these 
works to market.”  Goldstein, supra note 20, at 302. 
 235 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 
507 (1945) (“We do not expect that much of the literature and art which we desire can be 
produced by men who possess independent means or who derive their living from other 
occupations and make literature a by-product of their leisure hours.  Support by the 
government or by patrons on which authors used to depend, is today no good substitute 
for royalties.”). 
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beneficiaries of an author’s creativity and work.236  Besides 
ensuring authorship and the production, publication and 
distribution of literary and artistic works, the market also serves to 
compel authors to write for and appeal to the widest segment of 
society as authors begin viewing the public as their patron.  The 
public provides market demand that inclines authors and creators 
to write for the masses, as the most widely received and accepted 
works provide authors and creators with the guarantee of authorial 
success.237  Through the grant of property rights over literary and 
artistic works as incentives for creation, owners of copyright 
become entitled to internalize and appropriate benefits that accrue 
to the public from the availability of the work on the market.238  As 
it is difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty the true social 
value of intellectual property,239 copyright owners may be inclined 
 
 236 The market participants conventionally are comprised by authors or creators, 
copyright users (new authors and pirates) and consumers. See RICHARD WATT, 
COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOE? 8 (Edward Elgar 2000) (1963). 
 237 Augustine Birrell points out that highly popular authors and creators are most likely 
to reap rich pecuniary rewards from the public: 
To gain and retain the ear of this public even for a decade, to tickle 
their fancy, to win their confidence, is (to a prolific writer) to make a 
fortune. . . .  Half-a-dozen really popular novels . . . a couple of 
successful long-running plays, will put their authors in possession of 
a sum of money more than equalling in amount to the slow 
accumulations of thirty years of a laborious and successful 
professional life. 
BIRRELL, supra note 140, at 196. 
 238 This is done through the copyright owner’s right to prevent others from making 
copies.  The social costs of reduced access to these works are offset by the incentives 
provided to create the work in the first place.  This balance between access and incentives 
is the central concern in copyright law.  To achieve economic efficiency, copyright 
doctrines must maximize the benefits from the incentive to create while balancing the 
losses from reduced access and the administration of copyright protection. See William 
Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 326 (1989).  For a more recent discussion on recovering the fixed cost of producing 
copyrighted works from society, see Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and 
Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2005). 
 239 The difficulty in valuing copyrighted works stems from a lack of standard evaluation 
criteria that can be applied to all works to set one work apart from another.  Any form of 
authorship will undoubtedly be socially valuable by contributing to “the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  However, any criteria developed 
to value a work will be subject to an individual evaluator’s personal assessment.  
Professor Jane Ginsburg speaks of this difficulty in evaluating works for different levels 
of creativity in compilations and works of information. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation 
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to price literary and artistic works beyond the marginal price of 
production, known as rent seeking, of which society bears the costs 
of this restricted access to particular creative works240 unless 
acceptable substitutes for the particular work are available.241 
Markets, however, do not operate with the constraints of 
morality that are so important in the copyright system to ensure 
access to literary and artistic works for new authors and to 
safeguard society’s interest in pursuing knowledge and excellence 
through the availability of literary and artistic works.  As David 
Gauthier explains, “[i]n leaving each person free to pursue her 
interest in her own way, the market satisfies the ideal of moral 
anarchy” where individuals live within a society that knows no 
“deeper artifice of morality.”242  However, as Professor Gauthier 
rightfully points out, the “world is not a market” and “morality is a 
necessary constraint on the interaction of rational persons,”243 
particularly when this interaction of rational persons involves the 
exchange of entitlements over intangibles such as literary and 
artistic works, an exchange which general function in society is to 
serve an inherently moral purpose of allowing individuals to 
pursue knowledge and excellence, and encouraging authors to 
engage in authentic forms of creative authorship. 
 
and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1865, 1899–1900 (1990). 
 240 In intellectual property law, many of the issues, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, patent reform and database protection being some of them, are highly contested 
among many conflicting interests. See Mark Lemley, The Constitutionalization of 
Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532 (2000).  Strong interest groups push 
for certain agendas and Congress may respond favorably to certain interest groups and 
overlook the interests of the general public. See id. 
 241 The copyright market is actually a market where substitutes abound, quite unlike the 
market for patents, where property rights in patents may confer a large market share that 
may present entry barriers.  The copyright market for literary and artistic works is 
different.  One author’s expression is easily substitutable for another author’s.  This is 
probably because of the idea/expression distinction in copyright that makes ideas not 
copyrightable and allows them to be incorporated in other works. See Goldstein, supra 
note 20, at 84. 
 242 DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 84 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986). 
 243 Id. 
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In the present copyright market, where the internalization of 
external benefits is one of the main functions of property rights244 
and free-market exchange becomes impossible as property owners 
hold out from disclosing the true value of their property,245 
cooperation among all parties within the copyright system for the 
benefit of society is unlikely to occur.  Intellectual property 
scholars have pointed out the dangers of allowing complete 
internalization of social benefits through the extension of property 
rights,246 recognizing that free-riding is a natural and desirable 
consequence of industrial spillovers that contribute towards 
industrial innovativeness and social growth and development.247  
Many scholars have also argued that the attempt by copyright 
owners to recover all external benefits through copyright has a 
detrimental effect upon society248 and that the public’s right to 
 
 244 Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350 (1967). 
 245 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–07 (1972). 
 246 Some of the effects of extending intellectual property to allow for the internalization 
of externalities are the creation of deadweight losses that will have an adverse effect on a 
competitive market, the interference with another’s ability to create, rent seeking 
behavior by rights owners, and the high administrative costs that will arise from the 
enforcement of these rights.  Lemley, Property, supra note 29, at 1058–59. 
 247 Free-riding by society drives innovation and industries with greater spillovers to 
develop more innovation than industries with fewer spillovers. See Brett Frischmann & 
Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (2007). 
 248 Professor Lawrence Lessig, for example, argues that technology in the form of code 
provides copyright owners almost perfect control over the distribution and use of content. 
See LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 213, at 22–23, 147.  This form of control 
diminishes the vast potential for innovation on the Internet. See id.  Professor Lessig also 
argues that the expansion of intellectual property provides large media conglomerates the 
ability to affect how ordinary citizens live their everyday lives by preventing the 
development of new and more efficient technologies. See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra 
note 213, at 162.  Professor Jessica Litman argues that the public interest was not a 
consideration in the drafting of 1976 Copyright Act. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT 71–74 (Prometheus Books 2001).  The Act was drafted by representatives of 
copyright businesses with the public interest unrepresented in the legislative process. See 
id.  The effect of the Copyright Act is the forced compliance of the public to a law that 
they do not understand. Id.  Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan argues that the Government’s 
1995 White Paper, which confirmed the application of copyright to cyberspace, did not 
consider the public interest as a factor in setting a fair copyright balance. SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 159–60 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2001).  As a result, 
copyright owners gained more power to control, private interests prevailed over the 
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access literary and artistic works should prevail as soon as 
copyright owners recover the costs of production and 
dissemination through the rights provided.249  A vibrant public 
domain is necessary for creativity,250 and allowing all forms of 
external benefits to be captured through excessive claims of 
property rights over creative works would have the effect of 
enclosing the common pool of creative resources open to all for 
public use.251  The balance that copyright law must strike between 
providing rights as incentives to create and providing public access 
to creative materials to promote democratic civil discourse within 
the public252 allows the free flow of culture in society253 and 
ensures that economic growth and wealth distribution in a 
 
public, media conglomerates exerted influence on global copyright policy making and 
technology allowed copyright owners to prevent the public from getting access to their 
works. Id.  Professor Wendy Gordon criticizes the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act 
as having very little effect on the creativity of present authors and instead having negative 
effects upon creative people, who require access to existing works for inspiration in 
expression.  Wendy Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for 
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 187 (2003). 
 249 If copyright’s primary purpose is to encourage authors to write and produce creative 
works, then these works should be placed in the public as soon as the law’s purposes 
have been met. See John M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing 
the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 512–
13 (1999).  Also consider the judgment of Justice Stewart in Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, where he states, “[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but 
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability 
of literature, music, and the other arts.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151, 156 (1975).  Chief Justice Hughes expressed a similar opinion when he stated 
that the “sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.” 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).  Justice Douglas, citing Chief Justice 
Hughes, also stated the same opinion in his judgment: “[t]he copyright law, like the 
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. . . .  [T]he reward 
to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative 
genius.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 250 Professor Jessica Litman argues that the public domain provides the raw materials 
necessary for authorship to occur. See Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 65, at 965.  
Copyright is based on the idea of originality but most authors rely upon existing works to 
create new ones and are seldom inspired to independently create a completely new work. 
Id. at 968.  The public domain offers authors a vast source of creative resources by 
reserving non-copyrightable materials to the commons. Id. at 975. 
 251 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003). 
 252 See generally Netanel, Copyright, supra note 20. 
 253 See generally Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
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country’s development process occurs.254  Achieving this balance 
in the copyright system necessitates a collective agreement among 
all parties to the copyright system to ensure that each party acts in 
the interests of society as a whole within the boundaries of their 
legal entitlements. 
In this situation, a circumstance for justice, described by 
Professor Rawls as “the normal conditions under which human 
cooperation is both possible and necessary,” arises as “social 
cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would 
have if each were to try to live solely by his efforts.”255  Rawls 
identifies two conditions that give rise to the conditions for 
justice—an objective circumstance that makes human cooperation 
both possible and necessary and a subjective circumstance that 
reflects the different plans for life as well as the diversity of 
philosophical and religious beliefs and political and social 
doctrines that reflects the needs and interests of the subjects of 
cooperation.256  These two conditions, present in the copyright 
system, raise the circumstances for justice that make cooperation 
among all parties to the copyright system both possible and 
necessary. 
B. Copyright and the State of Nature/Original Position                  
Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness begins with the 
principles of justice as the object of the original agreement for 
cooperation.257  These principles of justice are “those which 
rational persons concerned to advance their interests would accept 
in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of their 
association.”258  In order to achieve this, “one must establish that, 
given the circumstances of the parties, and their knowledge, 
beliefs, and interests, an agreement on these principles is the best 
way for each person to secure his ends in view of the alternatives 
 
 254 See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006). 
 255 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 223, at 126–27. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 118–19. 
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available.”259  This agreement for cooperation begins at the 
original position as a purely hypothetical status quo where any 
agreements reached among the parties will be fair for the original 
position as “a state of affairs in which the parties are equally 
represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned 
by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social 
forces.”260  To achieve procedural fairness, Rawls stipulates that 
this agreement must be made behind a veil of ignorance: 
[where] no one knows his place in society, his class 
position or social status . . . his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence [and] strength . . . [or] his conception of 
the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, 
or even the special features of his psychology such 
as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or 
pessimism.  More than this . . . the parties do not 
know the particular circumstances of their own 
society . . . its economic or political situation, or the 
level of civilization and culture it has been able to 
achieve.261 
In the copyright system, the original position in which an 
agreement for cooperation according to the principles of justice as 
fairness wherein all parties to the copyright system—authors, 
readers and publishers/distributors—may secure their best interest 
in light of the alternatives available is therefore the position where 
all parties, not knowing the particular circumstances of the present 
copyright society, would agree to conduct their affairs and 
activities in a manner that achieves justice among all the parties 
involved.  This means that authors, readers and 
publishers/distributors must agree to cooperate in a just distribution 
of entitlements in literary and artistic works to ensure the mutual 
benefit of all, which requires certain moral or ethical restraints on 
the exercise of rights in literary and artistic works according to 
what is just to all parties. 
 
 259 Id. at 119. 
 260 Id. at 120. 
 261 Id. at 137. 
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C. Justice and Fairness in the Copyright System 
A conception of justice in the copyright system according to 
the social contract theory provides a guiding framework to subject 
the exercise of rights and allocation of entitlements in literary and 
artistic works to moral and ethical judgment.  A utilitarian-based 
system lacks the capacity to make value judgments to help us 
assess the fairness of particular positions taken by Congress, the 
courts and parties to the copyright system.  From the perspective of 
a pure utilitarian, the extension of the copyright term and property 
rights over literary and artistic works, for example, is an acceptable 
way to protect the economic interests of copyright owners by 
ensuring that investments made in producing works are protected 
and that works are continually exploited in accordance to the 
statutory rights that the law recognizes.  From a justice and fairness 
perspective of the social contract, this would be morally and 
ethically wrong because resources for society’s use are kept away 
from the reach of the public.  The agreement that all parties within 
the copyright system cooperate to achieve the best interests of all 
parties is violated if the public is denied access to creative works 
that are needed for other forms of creative production and 
authentic authorship.  Conversely, the violation of an author’s 
moral rights by subjecting the work to derogatory treatment against 
the artistic vision of the author also violates the social contract, for 
the best interest of the author is undermined when respect for his 
authentic expression through creative authorship is not duly given.  
These value judgments and ethical assessments will not be possible 
without the recognition of a cohesive social agreement among all 
parties to the copyright system to cooperate and act in each other’s 
best interests. 
D. Role of the Judiciary 
The judiciary’s role so far has been to defer to congressional 
wisdom on matters of intellectual property policy.262  Changing the 
philosophical foundation of the copyright system and embracing 
 
 262 See Paul Schwartz & William Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term 
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 
2334 (2003). 
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the concept of a social contract among all parties to the copyright 
system allows for greater judicial power to make moral and ethical 
assessments on principles of justice and fairness in a way that 
would enhance the role of the copyright system to encourage 
authentic authorship and the creation of literary and artistic works 
that would ultimately be of value and benefit to society.  Judges 
would also be able to take a more proactive role in defining the 
rights and obligations of all parties to the copyright system based 
on their natural rights and moral and ethical obligations to each 
other without being bound by the statutory provisions of the 
Copyright Act. 
CONCLUSION 
A utilitarian-based copyright system, while aiming to increase 
social welfare by granting property rights in literary and artistic 
works, has thus far produced a market for literary and artistic 
works that does not necessarily encourage authentic authorship and 
the creation of works that serves to ultimately benefit society.  The 
system has created an environment which facilitates the production 
of works that will be successfully commercialized on the market 
but which appears to operate to the benefit of copyright owners 
most of all.  Authors and their readers are not the primary 
beneficiaries of the present copyright system, which seems to be 
functioning as a legal system that protects the interests of 
economic investors in the production of creative works more than 
the interests of the author and the public.  By recognizing that there 
are both natural rights which authors acquire and possess by virtue 
of their labor and personality, and natural rights that society has to 
pursue knowledge and excellence through literary and artistic 
works, the copyright system may approach the allocation of 
entitlements and the recognition of rights in works on a principle 
of justice that promotes fairness among all parties to the copyright 
system. 
Professor Patterson and Stanley Lindberg remind us that the 
copyright system is comprised of three parties with legitimate and 
valid interests in literary and artistic works.  It would be a mistake 
for the law to emphasize the rights of any one party without 
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considering the effect of that emphasis on the rights and 
entitlements of the other two parties.  By acknowledging a social 
contract among all parties to the copyright system, we will be 
reminded that all three parties are a necessary and vital component 
to ensuring authentic authorship for the benefit of society as a 
whole.  As it is aptly stated by Professor Patterson and Stanley 
Lindberg: 
Traditionally viewed as a law for authors and 
artists, copyright was actually originated by 
publishers and has a long history of having 
benefited entrepreneurs much more than creators.  
A major purpose of this book, [The Nature of 
Copyright], is to explain the vagaries of history that 
caused this anomaly and thus to justify a new—and 
long overdue—perspective of copyright law: 
copyright as a law for consumers as well as for 
creators or marketers.  All three of these groups—
authors, publishers (or other entrepreneurs), and 
customers—are users of copyrighted materials, 
which is why the copyright law consists of three 
parts: a law of author’s rights, a law of publishers’ 
rights and a law of users’ rights.263 
A comprehensive theory of copyright law ought to account for 
these three interests in its jurisprudence.  The present utilitarian-
based copyright system does not account for all three interests.  By 
evaluating the copyright system from a natural law/natural rights 
contractarian perspective, all three interests may be accounted for 
to enable the law to allocate entitlements in literary and artistic 
works in accordance to principles of justice and fairness so that 
authentic authorship may occur for the benefit of society. 
 
 
 263 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 164, at 3–4. 
